Openings closed one after another?

On the Armenian position, expectations rose high after the visit President Abdullah Gül to the Armenian capital, Yerevan, and secret bilateral talks held in Geneva since August 2007. The expectation has peaked due to the visit of U.S. President Obama and the upcoming April 24 commemoration day. But, at least for now, Turkey’s border with Armenia remains closed. This time we heard from Prime Minister Erdoğan himself that he doesn’t lean on the package designed by diplomats of the two countries. His remarks Ğ "We cannot seal any deal that would hurt Azerbaijan" Ğ helped close this case. And now we even have a Web site on this approach: www.turkiye-ermenistan-kapilar-acilmasin.org (let’s not open the doors with Armenia).

Things way over our heads
It is extremely difficult for Turkey to resolve the Armenian issue through the resolution of the Karabakh conflict. Moreover, it is Turkey who, by closing unilaterally its border with Armenia in 1993 to show solidarity with Azerbaijan, has tied its hands for any bilateral deal with Armenia. This time, Azerbaijan, despite being constantly informed about the course of Turkish-Armenian talks, is enraged and this is probably nurtured by Russia. I didn’t say "Russia can remove Turkey from the Caucasus equation easily" for nothing. So can Iran. Iran having excellent relations with Armenia has no problem with Azerbaijan either.

Apparently, the Karabakh issue is more than Turkey can handle. Russia keeps Azerbaijan and Armenia in its hands and laps because of the Karabakh conflict and doesn’t want any durable solution. Armenia clearly depends on Russia: military and strategic relations, patrolling of the Turkish border, handsome Russian military bases, and a strong support in energy supply and in the Karabakh feud. Alright!

But in this case, where does this Russian love of Azerbaijan come from, as Azerbaijanis are supposed to seek alliances against the Armenian-Russia axis? What makes Azerbaijanis dependent on Russia? None of the reasons that are valid in the Armenia-Russia partnership can explain Azerbaijan’s dependency on Russia. The main factor leaving Azerbaijan in the Russian sphere of influence is the authoritarian and antidemocratic regime inherited from the Soviets.

Just like the case in Armenia, by the way. But in fact Azerbaijan’s democratic evolution could bring alone a solution to the Karabakh conflict. In a referendum to be held in Karabakh, democratic guarantees for Karabakh Armenians, provided by Azerbaijan, would bring a solution. But for now, it is impossible for the Azerbaijani authoritarian regime to go through such an evolution. Therefore, its Armenian policy is limited with a tactless approach of "Armenians are poor, but I have oil. I will wait until they are exhausted and take Karabakh back in the end." Turkey has made itself hostage of this policy closing the Turkish side of the Armenian border in 1993.

The Cyprus stalemate, as one of our antique foreign policy positions, will be on the agenda over the weekend. Parties defending "no solution is the solution" may win the April 19 elections in Turkish Cyprus. As a result, settlement talks with Greek Cypriots may once again go to the wall although they were going well despite all odds. With no solution at sight, Turkey may continue to lose time and money in Cyprus as a result of nationalist ambitions in a way to confirm the remarks of British Foreign Secretary James Callahan, who said in the aftermath of the 1974 military intervention that "your army captured the island but in time the island would capture your soldiers." And the fate of Kurdish overture and talks going on with the Kurdistan Regional Administration in northern Iraq may look like that of Turkey’s Armenian and Greek overtures.

It is not painless to clear the past mistakes. Adding clumsiness and nationalist rhetoric on top creates new deadlocks at all fronts. And Turkey continues to pay an arm and leg for its nationalist obsessions.