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TSK lifts boycott on Barzani
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The General Staff is extremely hopeful and expectant regarding efforts against PKK terror. The public is not greatly aware of it but the General Staff believes that the PKK is under huge international pressure and that a break up process has started. When carefully examining Gen. Başbuğ’s words in his latest speech you’ll understand expectations and preparations of the General Staff in this issue.
Başbuğ’s picture based on special evaluation and information, which I obtained from the General Staff milieu, shows that the Turkish Armed Forces, or TSK, has by all means taken action against the terror organization and has even started to change its attitude against matters it used to show reaction to, like, foremost the northern Iraq Kurdish Regional Administration issue.
You’ll remember when the AKP government in 2007-2008 wanted better relations with the northern Iraqi administration and especially with Barzani, and in the struggle against the PKK it wanted to draw Arbil on its side but the TSK used to oppose this. Former Chief of General Staff Büyükanıt would say: "Whoever wants to talk to them can do so, we won’t get in touch." And after Başbuğ took over the office of the Chief of General Staff, this attitude continued for some time. The Barzani administration used to complain that despite a green light from the government and close encounters with foreign affairs and MİT, the TSK won’t open the blinds and say: "The military holds the key but it denies us."
Başbuğ softened the Barzani boycott recently and finally "lifted the boycott on contacts and meetings." Either now or sometime soon a representative of the General Staff will start the process of meeting Barzani’s team. This is an important step for the TSK. For now this process is limited to lower levels and according to incoming signals from them the contact will continue on an upper protocol level.
So why are we experiencing this change?
To tell the truth, everybody following developments carefully will realize that the PKK is increasingly experiencing international pressure. The PKK is expected to put down its weapons, retreat from attacks and voice its message through political channels in a peaceful manner. The same voices are raised in all capital cities:
w The northern Iraqi administration, where the PKK continues its existence, wants this. In order to develop relations with Turkey it wants the PKK factor to fade from the scene.
w Baghdad has had enough and it wants the organization to stop being a problem between Turkey and itself.
w The United States, before withdrawing from Iraq, forces the PKK to put down its weapons in order to put back on track relation between Turkey and Iraq, and to ensure stability in the region.
The General Staff expects these important developments to pose an opportunity to make something happen by the end of the year. That’s why it is starting the meeting process with the Barzani administration. On one side it takes action to make the PKK come down from the mountains, on the other side it tries to convince the U.S. to come up with a mutual action plan.
Don’t call it ’Pardon’ but retreat from Qandil
When asking the General Staff: "is there a general pardon for the PKK?" we receive an automated response, "No, there can be no mention of pardon." We know that it won’t be called "pardon" but there will be some formulas to make it easier for the PKK to retreat from the mountains because the chief of general staff himself wants, for example, flexibility in the application of the existing law. He is nearly at a point of starting a campaign.
The law, applied for four years, says: "Those who have not used a weapon against security forces might be pardoned." But it is written in such a way that prosecutors and judges, afraid of being accused as "traitors" apply this law very carefully. They are afraid to incur the wrath of the military, media and nationalist parties.
According to numbers by Başbuğ, out of some 1,000 applicants there have been 660 people pardoned within the last four years. A very small number. Under these circumstances the PKK youngsters are afraid to apply. If he is denied he will end up in jail instead of going home. How can you tell who pulled the gun first? If those who have not killed anyone and have no blood on their hands knew that they would be pardoned, Qandil would be deserted to an important extent.
The General Staff, in order not to miss out on this opportunity, encourages prosecutors and judges to be flexible. On the other hand it asks the Barzani administration to take on a more brisk attitude in the PKK issue.
Barzani, too, is in a difficult position. They in return are waiting for a message from Ankara saying, "Turkey should do something to make it easier for us. We cannot force the PKK from Qandil by ourselves." As you see a meal is cooking up. And the PKK, knowing this, is trying to obtain something from Ankara. Something like a release of their leaders, Öcalan being set free, privileges for Kurds during Constitutional amendments. Turkish society becomes even more pessimistic with each new martyr but those closely involved in these matters are not that much pessimistic. On the contrary, they are exited to be benefiting from each new opportunity.
You’ll remember when the AKP government in 2007-2008 wanted better relations with the northern Iraqi administration and especially with Barzani, and in the struggle against the PKK it wanted to draw Arbil on its side but the TSK used to oppose this. Former Chief of General Staff Büyükanıt would say: "Whoever wants to talk to them can do so, we won’t get in touch." And after Başbuğ took over the office of the Chief of General Staff, this attitude continued for some time. The Barzani administration used to complain that despite a green light from the government and close encounters with foreign affairs and MİT, the TSK won’t open the blinds and say: "The military holds the key but it denies us."
Başbuğ softened the Barzani boycott recently and finally "lifted the boycott on contacts and meetings." Either now or sometime soon a representative of the General Staff will start the process of meeting Barzani’s team. This is an important step for the TSK. For now this process is limited to lower levels and according to incoming signals from them the contact will continue on an upper protocol level.
So why are we experiencing this change?
To tell the truth, everybody following developments carefully will realize that the PKK is increasingly experiencing international pressure. The PKK is expected to put down its weapons, retreat from attacks and voice its message through political channels in a peaceful manner. The same voices are raised in all capital cities:
w The northern Iraqi administration, where the PKK continues its existence, wants this. In order to develop relations with Turkey it wants the PKK factor to fade from the scene.
w Baghdad has had enough and it wants the organization to stop being a problem between Turkey and itself.
w The United States, before withdrawing from Iraq, forces the PKK to put down its weapons in order to put back on track relation between Turkey and Iraq, and to ensure stability in the region.
The General Staff expects these important developments to pose an opportunity to make something happen by the end of the year. That’s why it is starting the meeting process with the Barzani administration. On one side it takes action to make the PKK come down from the mountains, on the other side it tries to convince the U.S. to come up with a mutual action plan.
Don’t call it ’Pardon’ but retreat from Qandil
When asking the General Staff: "is there a general pardon for the PKK?" we receive an automated response, "No, there can be no mention of pardon." We know that it won’t be called "pardon" but there will be some formulas to make it easier for the PKK to retreat from the mountains because the chief of general staff himself wants, for example, flexibility in the application of the existing law. He is nearly at a point of starting a campaign.
The law, applied for four years, says: "Those who have not used a weapon against security forces might be pardoned." But it is written in such a way that prosecutors and judges, afraid of being accused as "traitors" apply this law very carefully. They are afraid to incur the wrath of the military, media and nationalist parties.
According to numbers by Başbuğ, out of some 1,000 applicants there have been 660 people pardoned within the last four years. A very small number. Under these circumstances the PKK youngsters are afraid to apply. If he is denied he will end up in jail instead of going home. How can you tell who pulled the gun first? If those who have not killed anyone and have no blood on their hands knew that they would be pardoned, Qandil would be deserted to an important extent.
The General Staff, in order not to miss out on this opportunity, encourages prosecutors and judges to be flexible. On the other hand it asks the Barzani administration to take on a more brisk attitude in the PKK issue.
Barzani, too, is in a difficult position. They in return are waiting for a message from Ankara saying, "Turkey should do something to make it easier for us. We cannot force the PKK from Qandil by ourselves." As you see a meal is cooking up. And the PKK, knowing this, is trying to obtain something from Ankara. Something like a release of their leaders, Öcalan being set free, privileges for Kurds during Constitutional amendments. Turkish society becomes even more pessimistic with each new martyr but those closely involved in these matters are not that much pessimistic. On the contrary, they are exited to be benefiting from each new opportunity.
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