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The PKK, afraid of the AKP, changed its tactic
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Erdoğan was the man of 2008. The year’s event: Headscarf combats. But what shocked our daily lives most for the past 12 months was the PKK, who controlled the agenda as it wished. The most obvious mental state of the terror organization was FEAR.
The PKK was scared by the vote explosion for the Justice and Development Party, or AKP, in the southeast during the elections in July 2007. Thinking that the Democratic Society Party, or DTP, would bring out 40 parliament members easily, coming up with only 20 members created a huge disappointment. PKK leaders were certain that, without any effort, they’d be able to receive all the votes of the people of Kurdish origin. DTP municipalities not being able to supply sufficient services, and more importantly, the AKP distributing charity to the poor in the region and Erdoğan’s interpretation of "Kurds" had upset existing balances. And especially when the impression was added on top this that the AKP was pushed around by the secular state, votes surprisingly went to the AKP.
After the elections in August 2007, this fear was observed very clearly during the general assembly in Quandil. If there wasn’t to be an end to this, even Diyarbakır could be lost in the local elections in 2009. AKP staff was openly announcing target municipalities in the southeast as their goal anyway. This possibility meant that the PKK would collapse and the DTP would be erased from the face of the region. One other aspect that the PKK feared was that in November 2007 Erdoğan convinced Bush to accept the sharing of information regarding activities in northern Iraq, and especially along the border. The PKK would be pressured military and political matters.
Events shaping 2008 were planned within this frame. Increased terror:
The most important aspect for the PKK is to shed more blood in the region and in Turkey, to plan more spectacular assassinations, huge demonstrations take the youth to the streets and make security forces respond in a brutal way. This way they would have control over the agenda and gather its supporters again. The PKK shed blood for one year, as they had planned. Great events and huge demonstrations were conducted. It committed crimes that got cities up in arms and created immense reactions in rural areas.
The PKK chose the most treasonous tactic and killed soldiers and civilians alike by using remote-controlled mines. With operations in Dağlıca and Aktütün it paved the way for rising doubts in the minds of the Turkish public regarding the effectiveness of security forces. For the first time, the Turkish public encountered articles in the news full of criticism regarding the Turkish Armed Forces, or TSK. Up until now this was never seen before. Especially the leaking of information out of the General Staff was never heard of before. The PKK’s general attitude was to create a fight between the Turks and Kurds, or even grounds for a civil war. But despite all efforts, it was not successful.
Not being able to transfer enough power into Turkey from its northern Iraq camps was one other aspect in which it was unsuccessful. TSK’s air and ground operations as well as the reduction of support by Barzani’s administration made PKK’s life harder. In the end, the PKK planned 149 armed attacks in 2008. 109 of our soldiers were martyred and their loss amounted to 670. Maybe they received much attention from the public and were much talked about, but the result of PKK’s terror was a big failure.
In summary, the PKK was on our agenda with its demonstrators, gathered supporters and increased the number of those who went into the mountains and took up arms but did not reach anything in military matters. Their weakness against the TSK continued.
DTP surrendered
It is not certain whether the DTP decided to act like this or the PKK forced it to come to the forefront. What’s certain is that the DTP and PKK consented and this party, especially in the middle of 2008, identified itself with the PKK. Before it used to be reluctant and overshadow relations with the PKK as much as possible. As the decision regarding a closing case, which was filed in 2007, approached, the DTP openly started to defend the PKK. Leaders of the PKK and DTP took on an attitude as if they wanted the party to be closed. DTP for the first time started to describe the PKK as an organization born out of the Kurdish people.
Afterwards, a campaign was started to lay claim to Öcalan, and better his conditions in İmralı. "Freedom for Öcalan" wasn’t expressed explicitly, but it seemed as if they were getting there slowly. Finally, the last step was taken when through the DTP Kurdish demands were revealed. In some sort of a federation frame they requested that the Kurds be able to manage themselves and that all constrictions in language education be lifted.
Neither the PKK nor DTP could come close to their target
They bothered all of us. Attracted the public’s attention and controlled the agenda. But neither the PKK nor the DTP could fulfill their expectations.
The PKK could not force Turkish security forces to give in. It could not keep some regions under its control. Regional camps, especially along the border to northern Iraq, could not survive. Along the border, entries and exits have mostly been limited. Turkish security forces along with the American information service and Barzani’s lack of support the organization experienced pressure. Based on an agreement with Iran, the region of Quandil was constantly bombarded. Maybe strategic caves and camps in Quandil were not vacated but the organization was not able to stick its head out of its shelters.
Despite all efforts, the DTP could not establish a dialogue with Turkey in the name of Kurds. It couldn’t become an actor in the search for results. The first factor for it to be pushed in the background was that the Turkish Republic did not become involved in dialogue; and the second factor was that the PKK wanted to remain the sole actor and not have the DTP steal its role.
The most important handicap for the PKK was that it slowly started to lose its external alleys. Barzani’s approach to Ankara É Iran taking a coordinated struggle decision simultaneously with Turkey É the European Union Parliament identifying the organization as a terrorist group and supporting Ankara É Washington preferring Ankara. If we summon up, the PKK received much attention in 2008 but could not shake Turkey.
After the elections in August 2007, this fear was observed very clearly during the general assembly in Quandil. If there wasn’t to be an end to this, even Diyarbakır could be lost in the local elections in 2009. AKP staff was openly announcing target municipalities in the southeast as their goal anyway. This possibility meant that the PKK would collapse and the DTP would be erased from the face of the region. One other aspect that the PKK feared was that in November 2007 Erdoğan convinced Bush to accept the sharing of information regarding activities in northern Iraq, and especially along the border. The PKK would be pressured military and political matters.
Events shaping 2008 were planned within this frame. Increased terror:
The most important aspect for the PKK is to shed more blood in the region and in Turkey, to plan more spectacular assassinations, huge demonstrations take the youth to the streets and make security forces respond in a brutal way. This way they would have control over the agenda and gather its supporters again. The PKK shed blood for one year, as they had planned. Great events and huge demonstrations were conducted. It committed crimes that got cities up in arms and created immense reactions in rural areas.
The PKK chose the most treasonous tactic and killed soldiers and civilians alike by using remote-controlled mines. With operations in Dağlıca and Aktütün it paved the way for rising doubts in the minds of the Turkish public regarding the effectiveness of security forces. For the first time, the Turkish public encountered articles in the news full of criticism regarding the Turkish Armed Forces, or TSK. Up until now this was never seen before. Especially the leaking of information out of the General Staff was never heard of before. The PKK’s general attitude was to create a fight between the Turks and Kurds, or even grounds for a civil war. But despite all efforts, it was not successful.
Not being able to transfer enough power into Turkey from its northern Iraq camps was one other aspect in which it was unsuccessful. TSK’s air and ground operations as well as the reduction of support by Barzani’s administration made PKK’s life harder. In the end, the PKK planned 149 armed attacks in 2008. 109 of our soldiers were martyred and their loss amounted to 670. Maybe they received much attention from the public and were much talked about, but the result of PKK’s terror was a big failure.
In summary, the PKK was on our agenda with its demonstrators, gathered supporters and increased the number of those who went into the mountains and took up arms but did not reach anything in military matters. Their weakness against the TSK continued.
DTP surrendered
It is not certain whether the DTP decided to act like this or the PKK forced it to come to the forefront. What’s certain is that the DTP and PKK consented and this party, especially in the middle of 2008, identified itself with the PKK. Before it used to be reluctant and overshadow relations with the PKK as much as possible. As the decision regarding a closing case, which was filed in 2007, approached, the DTP openly started to defend the PKK. Leaders of the PKK and DTP took on an attitude as if they wanted the party to be closed. DTP for the first time started to describe the PKK as an organization born out of the Kurdish people.
Afterwards, a campaign was started to lay claim to Öcalan, and better his conditions in İmralı. "Freedom for Öcalan" wasn’t expressed explicitly, but it seemed as if they were getting there slowly. Finally, the last step was taken when through the DTP Kurdish demands were revealed. In some sort of a federation frame they requested that the Kurds be able to manage themselves and that all constrictions in language education be lifted.
Neither the PKK nor DTP could come close to their target
They bothered all of us. Attracted the public’s attention and controlled the agenda. But neither the PKK nor the DTP could fulfill their expectations.
The PKK could not force Turkish security forces to give in. It could not keep some regions under its control. Regional camps, especially along the border to northern Iraq, could not survive. Along the border, entries and exits have mostly been limited. Turkish security forces along with the American information service and Barzani’s lack of support the organization experienced pressure. Based on an agreement with Iran, the region of Quandil was constantly bombarded. Maybe strategic caves and camps in Quandil were not vacated but the organization was not able to stick its head out of its shelters.
Despite all efforts, the DTP could not establish a dialogue with Turkey in the name of Kurds. It couldn’t become an actor in the search for results. The first factor for it to be pushed in the background was that the Turkish Republic did not become involved in dialogue; and the second factor was that the PKK wanted to remain the sole actor and not have the DTP steal its role.
The most important handicap for the PKK was that it slowly started to lose its external alleys. Barzani’s approach to Ankara É Iran taking a coordinated struggle decision simultaneously with Turkey É the European Union Parliament identifying the organization as a terrorist group and supporting Ankara É Washington preferring Ankara. If we summon up, the PKK received much attention in 2008 but could not shake Turkey.
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