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Barzani waiting for a signal in PKK matters
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The northern Kurdish administration made its choice in the short, medium and long run. In the short run it is important to protect Iraq’s integrity and continue its influence in the central administration. But developments in the medium run, after the withdrawal of U.S. forces, scare the Kurds. And they are right in being scared. This year there will be local and general elections.
It is not clear how the administration of the country will be structured and whether the Sunni and Shiite will favor devoting themselves to driving the democratic system or whether each will try to keep the other under control. In case the Shiite exercise pressure on the Sunni and Kurds, in order to obtain control over the country internal conflict will arise.
This possibility is what worries the Kurds.
Internal pressure from the Shiite and external pressure from Iran increases the danger of Kurds losing what they have obtained so far. Under these circumstances, the only country on which Barzani can lean up against is Turkey.
Turkey, in the long run, will become an indispensable ally for northern Iraqi Kurds. Barzani and Kurdish leaders are well aware of the situation and slip, as much as possible, into reconciling politics with Ankara, instead of fighting. Even if geographical facts constrain this rapprochement, the presence of 15 million distant and close relatives of northern Iraqi Kurds living in Turkey gives Ankara a certain weight. But what’s left is the Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK, issue. Barzani knows that as long as the presence of the PKK persists there will be no healthy cooperation. But Ankara won’t understand that it cannot fight the PKK on its own.
PKK lost function
Talking to northern Iraq authorities you’ll understand that the PKK has lost its function in the region and entered a period of hurting rather than providing an advantage for Barzani.
The PKK has provided Barzani some prestige among Kurds in Turkey and influence in Ankara. But the PKK and Kurdish terror organizations linked to the PKK could not be kept under control are in contrast with the Barzani administration’s benefits in the long run. The PKK has grown a lot and has started to bite its protecting hand. To tell the truth, Barzani does not want the PKK to withdrawal completely out of Qandil. For he knows that he does not have the power to do so. They counted 3,500 dead in the fight with the Turkish Armed Forces, or TSK, in the period of 1992 to 1996. For a population of four million this is a high percentage. Besides, everybody knows that the PKK cannot be driven out of Qandil’s mountains that easily. Therefore they are waiting for a signal from Ankara in order to take certain control over PKK’s operations and enhance relations with Turkey. Neither Barzani nor Talabani have a concrete solution regarding the PKK. Both know that the PKK is a fireball. They also realize that it cannot be totally destroyed. In the back of their minds lies the idea of "Instead of destroying, keep under control." They believe that the PKK should neither destroy nor be completely destroyed. They have to keep such an important balance, and better expressed perform required fine acrobatic calculations. Because they lack strength to act on their own they want to act together with Turkey. They don’t have a concrete plan but a general strategy for an action plan. If you study statements of northern Iraqi leaders and those who have a say in the administration you’ll find the main points of this strategy.
w For the past few months it has been voiced that an international Kurd conference idea keeps gaining strength. This conference, where the PKK will be kept out, but DTP admitted, will call on the PKK for a cease-fire and lay down guns. This way they will take on an international attitude.
w Turkey will forgive PKK members who have not shed any blood. They will not show reaction to leaders who visit other countries. Öcalan will be transferred into an environment where he can see others (this has already started), instead of being kept in solitary confinement. It will also lift limitations on the Kurdish education and cultural activities with communication being the foremost.
w The PKK will have to leave camps along the border and be allowed to stay in Qandil as long as they put down their weapons.
The filling in of the lines of this general outline are still worked on through informal contact between the Turkish foreign ministry, MIT bureaucracy and the Arbil administration. But the TSK does not join this activity. The Kurdish administration says that as long as the chief of the staff does not participate in this activity there will be no result obtained. Despite the persistent wish of TSK participating in this activity there has been no result achieved as yet.
The one who is the most annoyed in this activity and showing brisk reaction is the PKK. It realizes that the initiative will get out of hand. The Arbil-Ankara rapprochement poses the biggest threat for the terror organization. Even if it is not able to stop this course it tries to slow it down. It tries to annoy Turkey by increasing terror. You’ll see as the Arbil-Ankara rapprochement increases, bomb attacks will also increase in northern Iraq. This is the situation right now. If tomorrow new conditions arise we might find ourselves in brand new negotiations.
This possibility is what worries the Kurds.
Internal pressure from the Shiite and external pressure from Iran increases the danger of Kurds losing what they have obtained so far. Under these circumstances, the only country on which Barzani can lean up against is Turkey.
Turkey, in the long run, will become an indispensable ally for northern Iraqi Kurds. Barzani and Kurdish leaders are well aware of the situation and slip, as much as possible, into reconciling politics with Ankara, instead of fighting. Even if geographical facts constrain this rapprochement, the presence of 15 million distant and close relatives of northern Iraqi Kurds living in Turkey gives Ankara a certain weight. But what’s left is the Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK, issue. Barzani knows that as long as the presence of the PKK persists there will be no healthy cooperation. But Ankara won’t understand that it cannot fight the PKK on its own.
PKK lost function
Talking to northern Iraq authorities you’ll understand that the PKK has lost its function in the region and entered a period of hurting rather than providing an advantage for Barzani.
The PKK has provided Barzani some prestige among Kurds in Turkey and influence in Ankara. But the PKK and Kurdish terror organizations linked to the PKK could not be kept under control are in contrast with the Barzani administration’s benefits in the long run. The PKK has grown a lot and has started to bite its protecting hand. To tell the truth, Barzani does not want the PKK to withdrawal completely out of Qandil. For he knows that he does not have the power to do so. They counted 3,500 dead in the fight with the Turkish Armed Forces, or TSK, in the period of 1992 to 1996. For a population of four million this is a high percentage. Besides, everybody knows that the PKK cannot be driven out of Qandil’s mountains that easily. Therefore they are waiting for a signal from Ankara in order to take certain control over PKK’s operations and enhance relations with Turkey. Neither Barzani nor Talabani have a concrete solution regarding the PKK. Both know that the PKK is a fireball. They also realize that it cannot be totally destroyed. In the back of their minds lies the idea of "Instead of destroying, keep under control." They believe that the PKK should neither destroy nor be completely destroyed. They have to keep such an important balance, and better expressed perform required fine acrobatic calculations. Because they lack strength to act on their own they want to act together with Turkey. They don’t have a concrete plan but a general strategy for an action plan. If you study statements of northern Iraqi leaders and those who have a say in the administration you’ll find the main points of this strategy.
w For the past few months it has been voiced that an international Kurd conference idea keeps gaining strength. This conference, where the PKK will be kept out, but DTP admitted, will call on the PKK for a cease-fire and lay down guns. This way they will take on an international attitude.
w Turkey will forgive PKK members who have not shed any blood. They will not show reaction to leaders who visit other countries. Öcalan will be transferred into an environment where he can see others (this has already started), instead of being kept in solitary confinement. It will also lift limitations on the Kurdish education and cultural activities with communication being the foremost.
w The PKK will have to leave camps along the border and be allowed to stay in Qandil as long as they put down their weapons.
The filling in of the lines of this general outline are still worked on through informal contact between the Turkish foreign ministry, MIT bureaucracy and the Arbil administration. But the TSK does not join this activity. The Kurdish administration says that as long as the chief of the staff does not participate in this activity there will be no result obtained. Despite the persistent wish of TSK participating in this activity there has been no result achieved as yet.
The one who is the most annoyed in this activity and showing brisk reaction is the PKK. It realizes that the initiative will get out of hand. The Arbil-Ankara rapprochement poses the biggest threat for the terror organization. Even if it is not able to stop this course it tries to slow it down. It tries to annoy Turkey by increasing terror. You’ll see as the Arbil-Ankara rapprochement increases, bomb attacks will also increase in northern Iraq. This is the situation right now. If tomorrow new conditions arise we might find ourselves in brand new negotiations.
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