Yusuf Kanlı

There has been a marked change in the atmosphere in the U.S. capital regarding Turkey since Barack Hussein Obama replaced George W. Bush in the White House. In official and unofficial messages coming from Washington on the one hand there has been an increasing stress on Turkey’s regional leadership role while on the other hand there has been strongest-ever criticism expressing deep worries against both the limitations of freedom of expression, journalists fearing reprisals if they criticized the ruling AKP government and Prime Minister Erdoğan and the growing conservatism and Islamofascist trends in Turkey’s governance which has been instigating anti-Americanism, anti-Semitism and all sorts of hate speech on the streets.

As has always been the case when there is a Democrat president in the White House, an emphasis on human rights, individual rights, freedom of opinion and thought and minority rights will have more prominence in the Turkish-American relations than the predominantly defense cooperation dimension or military cooperation based perceptions of the Bush-like presidents.

Assuming that the U.S will need Turkey’s cooperation in withdrawing from Iraq or for its operations in Afghanistan and for such similar reasons or just because of the dictate of American contingency plans on Iran, the U.S. administration will be compelled to maintain good ties with Ankara and for that reason will remain silent on regression in the rights sphere, oppression of free thought, spread of hate speech or Ankara drifting from West and gradually anchoring the theocratic mentality of the East, will be a gross miscalculation for the present-day political rulers of Turkey.

Outbursts that could charm the chauvinistic desires of the masses suffering from inferiority complex may help earn few additional percentage points more votes in an election but with such behavior incompatible with statesmanship and poorly designed plots Turkey can only achieve isolating itself from the league of democratic nations and drift away from the European Union. These were indeed a summary of the assessments of Soner Çağaptay of the Washington Institute, Mark Parris, former U.S. ambassador to Turkey and Ian Lesser, a senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund that I presented in this column last week. One might say, of course, that Cağaptay, a Turkish-American, has been always against the AKP government. But, were not Parris and Lesser so sympathetic to the AKP rule in Turkey over the past six years? Is not the change in their approaches to developments in Turkey significant? Indeed so. The remarks of Parris, Lesser, as well as the recently released Human Rights Report of the State Department strongly criticizing the tactics of the government in silencing the media and the opposition are all indicative of the AKP losing its much-needed legitimacy to remain afloat in Turkey in the absence of domestic legitimacy.

’Leadership’ message is important

Indeed, the stress in Washington remarks, as well as in the Ankara remark of Obama’s special Mideast envoy George Mitchell, that Turkey’s leadership was important for peace in this region, were a reminder with a soft diplomatic jargon to Ankara and to Erdoğan that the U.S. administration expected Turkey and Erdoğan to act like a leader. What are the qualities of a leader? A leader is the one who does not create problems, but solves problems or contributes to a resolution of the problems. Is the message clear?

Apparently Erdoğan did not receive the message and he still continued talking as if he was an advocate of the Hamas terror gang. However, the message of Washington was that Ankara expected to convince Hamas to give up arms and engage in the peace process like a political party. Erdoğan continued to mix up democracy and election; civility and civilian politics with millenarianism, radicalism and terrorism.

On March 7, Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton will be making her first trip to Ankara since coming to office. Like most Turks I hope the visit becomes a prelude to an Obama trip to Ankara. Yet, Turkish administrators must understand that future of Turkish-U.S. relations will no longer be shaped through military cooperation only. Rights dimension is back on the agenda which as well includes the Armenian issue, the Cyprus problem as well as minority issues and individual rights.

Yesterday, I tried to present extensive excerpts from Soner Çağaptay, former U.S. ambassador to Turkey, Mark Parris, and Ian Lesser, a senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund who recently participated at a policy forum luncheon hosted in Washington by The Washington Institute and presented their much valuable perspectives about the drift towards conservatism in Turkey. Today, I will try to present the discussions of the three analysts regarding what should be the Obama administration's policy toward Turkey. Though the analysts were kind enough not to directly refer either to the prospective Armenian genocide crisis in Turkish-American relations or the possible direct and indirect impacts of growing anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism due the neo-Ottomanist sentiments in Ankara, their assessments will perhaps help the ostriches in Ankara to understand that burying their heads in sand and, because they cannot see anything going awry, pretending as if everything is on right course will help no one. Particularly, Cagaptay’s six suggestions to the Obama administration underline at the same time to potential hot potatoes (from the fight against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, to Iran and Turkey’s EU bid) what not only the Americans, but the administrators in Ankara will have to deal with in 2009.

Mark Parris

"The Obama administration should help build liberal democracy in Turkey. Threats to this progress come in different forms, such as in 2007 when the Turkish military warned the AKP (Justice and Development Party) not to change the country's secular orientation. Europe is the key to keeping Turkey on the right track."

Soner Çağaptay

"The Obama administration should engage Turkey in a multipronged initiative, though one with strong gauges, to prevent the country's slide away from the West and liberal democratic values. Washington should treat Turkey as a Western country and take six concrete steps to rebuild bilateral ties. First, Obama should maintain strong cooperation against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, including ongoing discussions with Turkey, Baghdad, and the Iraqi Kurds to this end. Since 2007, U.S. assistance to Turkey against the PKK has helped improve Washington's standing in Turkey and built mutual confidence. Second, the U.S. administration should rebuild bilateral military cooperation and emphasize NATO's role in U.S.-Turkish ties. If the Obama administration cannot win the hearts and minds of mid-level Turkish officers, Washington cannot sustain military ties with Turkey in the long term. NATO also provides a gauge with which to check Turkish foreign policy's slip away from the United States. Once Obama builds a consensus in NATO, such as a common stance on Iran, he should expect to find Turkey onboard. The third step is to counter the new anti-Western paradigm of Turkish foreign policy. This is where the Turkish leadership has to step up to the plate. Turkey sits a fence between the Middle East and the West; pro-Western and anti-Western statements carry equal weight in shaping public opinion toward the West. Accordingly, to improve the U.S. image in Turkey, the Turkish government needs to highlight for the public the two countries' commonalities, including institutions such as NATO, values such as democracy and free markets, and regional interests such as a stable Iraq. Fourth, President Obama, while renewing transatlantic ties, must convince the French president to move ahead with Turkey's EU candidacy. Fifth, economic ties and energy cooperation should be promoted to provide a "shock absorber" to the U.S.-Turkey relationship.

Ian Lesser

"With the current international market instability, the implications of getting Turkey into the EU have become more costly. With the global crisis deepening, Turkey’s accession will be seen as a greater potential burden by European countries. At this point, it will be difficult for Turkey to get the Obama administration's attention. During this period of domestic troubles, the United States might be looking for low-maintenance partnerships, and Turkey has not necessarily been an easy partner to work with. Continued convergence between Turkey and its Western partners is desirable, but Turkey should not expect miracles from the Obama administration regarding its ability to change the EU's stance on Turkey. Still, the president should make a visit to Turkey as part of his European trip to underline Turkey's European identity."

Recently, there was a policy forum luncheon hosted in Washington by The Washington Institute. The institute’s Soner Cagaptay, former U.S. ambassador to Turkey Mark Parris, and Ian Lesser, a senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund, participated in the panel. The three eminent speakers provided some very valuable thoughts on how Turkey was starting to be perceived in the U.S. capital. The assessments of the three eminent speakers require no further comment as they vividly demonstrated the drift in Turkey.

Soner Cagaptay

"The Justice and Development Party (AKP) is shaping Turkish society in its own image, promoting social conservatism through administrative acts. It is not religiosity that is on the rise in Turkey, but rather government-infused social conservatism. Indications of social conservatism, such as women wearing Islamic-style headscarves (turbans), are used as benchmarks to obtain government appointments, promotions, and contracts. Social conservatism, however, is not in itself the problem, and a conservative Turkey can certainly be European. The problem is that a government-led project of this type is incompatible with the idea of a liberal democracy. And given Turkey's nature as an elite project, AKP-led social conservatism is reshaping Turkish society. ... The new AKP elite are also reshaping Turkish foreign policy. In the past, Turkey's foreign policy paradigm centered on the promotion of national interests vested in the West. Today, the paradigm is based on a civilizational view of the world, manifested by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's recent treatment of events in the Gaza Strip and Sudan. The government's sympathy for Hamas and harsh remarks for Israel's attack on civilians coincided with an Ankara visit by the Sudanese vice-president as his government faced charges on genocide at the International Criminal Court in The Hague.

The AKP cares if Muslims are killed by non-Muslims, but not if Muslims kill Muslims. For the AKP, the problem in the Middle East is not violence or human suffering, but rather Muslims suffering at the hands of non-Muslims. The subsequent anti-Western, anti-U.S., and anti-Israeli view is the new paradigm promoted by pundits, think tanks, and newspapers close to the AKP. This paradigm drives public opinion, which is becoming increasingly anti-Western and anti-American. And because Turkey is a democracy, public opinion matters. Sooner or later, the anti-Western views will cripple Turkey's foreign policy partnership with the West."

Mark Parris

"Many know the concept of Occam's Razor: If a problem has two explanations, go with the simpler one. For example, one can view Erdoğan as anxious to pack the Turkish bureaucracy with people who share his world view, who display paranoia toward the press, whose vision is limited to the next elections, and whose enthusiasm for the United States and Europe is tied to a calculation of "what can you do for me." From this, you can conclude either of two things: that Erdoğan has a secret agenda and wants to impose an Islamic paradigm on Turkey, or that he shares the same political culture as his predecessors, is acting much the same way they did, and is not retreating from the democratic ideal. ... In terms of foreign policy, the AKP's record is marked by Turkey's closeness to Sudan, Russia and Iran, and paints an alarming picture. But it is not only Turkey that is getting closer to Sudan Ğ Russia is as well. One can look at these changes and see a shift toward an anti-U.S., or even anti-Semitic, picture."


Ian Lesser

"The global economic crisis will eventually have an effect on Turkish foreign policy. The implications of getting Turkey into the EU have become more costly with the current international market instability and Turkey will be seen as a greater potential burden by European countries during accession talks. ... The AKP's changes to Turkish foreign policy are not merely the party's project anymore. All Turks embrace them. What is dangerous about this shift in orientation is not necessarily its direction, but the fact that it is neither focused nor well prioritized." Tomorrow, I will try to cover the discussions of the three analysts regarding what should be the Obama administration's policy towards Turkey.

Under the coordination of the Istanbul Policy Center at Sabancı University, the Education Reform Initiative, or ERG, issued an "Equality in education: Policy analysis and suggestions" report this week. In a way, this report was an answer to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan who for some time updated his "every family must have at least three kids otherwise tomorrow it will be too late" rhetoric with the "No, three is not enough, every family must have at least five kids" oddity. The ERG report (http://www.erg.sabanciuniv.edu) puts a magnifying glass on the anomalous situation of the Turkish education system, as well as on the continued serious gender inequality problem in the country. For example, I would not think until reading the report that the probability of a daughter of a high school graduate father going to high school education is still less than 2 percent, or the highest income group spends 21 fold higher to the education of their kids than the lowest income group.

Bitter figures

The ERG report is underlining some very striking conclusions. Some of them were: 

* The rate of participation in education of girls in southeastern parts of the country is half of that in Istanbul. 

* The highest income group has a 21 fold higher education spending than the lowest income group. While 28 percent of the 7 to 23 age group in the highest income group have access to higher education, in the lowest income group only 0.4 percent can have a university education.

* 15 percent of the 15 to 19 age group don’t have primary school certificate.

* Seven in every 10 Turks who did not receive proper primary education are girls.

* In the age 15 group, 32 percent don’t understand what they read while 52 percent of them cannot solve simple mathematics problems.

* The probability of a girl with three brothers in a rural low-income family of primary school graduate parents is in between 1 to 2 percent. Whereas, in an urban family with university graduate parents a boy has 68 to 70 percent probability of graduating from a high school.

* Of the students from the lowest socioeconomic group 51 percent go to vocational schools and high schools with multiple programs while 5 percent go to the Anadolu High Schools. Of the students from the highest socioeconomic group, on the other hand, only three percent go to vocational schools while 49 percent go to Anadolu High Schools.

* One year increase in the education level of parents has a reflection of three percent increase in the probability of participation in education by girl students.

* One year increase in the education level of father has a reflection of ten percent increase in girls and 15 percent increase in boys participating in higher education.

* In families where the mother is the sole parent, participation of girls is 38 percent lower in primary education and 69 percent lower in higher education.

* In families where more than half of the income comes from agriculture, the rate of girls participating in education is 19 percent less than that of the boys.

* Although eight-year primary education has become compulsory, 100 percent of schooling is not yet achieved. There are marked regional differences. For example the probability of a girl living in rural areas of southeastern Turkey having access to a school is between 48 to 52 percent.



Larger population or better

education?

For Erdoğan, having a more populous and younger Turkish nation appears to be far more important than having a properly educated society. However it is the state’s duty to provide equality in education. Rather than advising people to have three, five or more kids or perhaps rather than wasting the resources of the nation to buy votes by distributing alms, this country must accelerate its investments in education.

However, while the backward and illiterate can easily be politically manipulated, such a thing will become rather difficult in a better educated society. Naturally, it might be more advisable for political leaders to advise people have more kids than concentrating on providing better education for our kids.

It would be a great underestimation to consider the crusade of the government on the Doğan Group as a "routine" operation against tax evasion or a landmark manifestation of the Finance Ministry that even the biggest media group of the country could be asked to give an account of some alleged faulty dealings. What’s being undertaken by the government is nothing less than trying to silence whatever opposition might be left in the country and consolidate absolute rule of the absolute leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Main opposition CHP leader Deniz Baykal was correct right from the beginning in declaring that what we have encountered as a direct and serious challenge to the democratic republic adhering to the supremacy of law. Naturally, Doğan Holding will take the cut-throat fine of almost $500 million to court and the court will rule to what extend the Finance Ministry acted to punish an alleged tax evasion attempt or to suppress critics of the government. What is very clear for us is that Turkish democracy is facing a serious and existential threat in the hands of a political majority obsessed with majoritarianism, which is getting more and more frustrated with critical voices and which considers silencing of the opposition as a life or death matter for itself.

The government is fed up with the warnings that having almost absolute parliamentary majority does not give the ruling AKP the absolute right to rule the country in any fashion it likes and that it is required to conform with the Constitution, laws and regulations as well as abide with the norms of democracy.

Government’s bad track record

This government has a very bad track record in its relations with the media. The nation must remember what had happened to the Uzan media group, as well as to the Dinç Bilgin empire or to the tiny yet powerful HaberTürk TV channel. Today, there is no Uzan group. The newspaper of Uzans is now one of the most prominent elements of the allegiant media while the TV of that group was bought by the Doğan Media Group and maintains its independent reporting tradition. The ATV channel of the Dinç Bilgin as well as the Sabah newspaper of that group were sold to the company of the son-in-law of the president after the banking watchdog confiscated them because of the collapsed bank of Bilgin. Who paid for the ATV and Sabah? Two state-owned banks opened an unprecedented credit to the son-in-law’s company. That was not enough, the president, prime minister and ministers paid visits to Qatar, convinced the emir of Qatar and the Qatar Development Fund became a partner of the company of the son-in-law in taking over Sabah and ATV. The end result? Sabah has become the flagship of the allegiant media. Does anyone remember what had happened to HaberTürk’s Tuncay Özkan, who is now behind bars in connection with the so-called Ergenekon trial? Such an immense tax fine was imposed on it that Özkan was compelled to sell the TV channel to yet another businessman supporting the world view and political approaches of the AKP and Premier Erdoğan. Step by step since the Nov. 3, 2002 landslide AKP victories for Erdoğan and his gang of merry men in the party and in the flourishing "green" business community are out to convert Turkey into a rose garden devoid of any thorns.

The action they have taken on Doğan Media Group was the most blatant one due to the reason that the fine was imposed with some trivial charges that I believe will all be invalidated by the court. The problem is the fact that a court process will take years and the Doğan group will suffer a lot in the mean time. As I tried to explain the other day, the fine was imposed on grounds of being eight days late in reporting the sale of 25 percent of the shares of the Doğan TV company to a German company. Doğan documented that due to the Christmas holiday in Germany the sale could not be completed on Dec. 24, 2006 and that the actual sale was done on Jan. 2, 2007. Was the sale reported? Yes. Did Doğan pay the tax required to be paid? Yes. But the Finance Ministry is charging that the tax ought to be paid in 2006, not in 2007. Was there any difference between 2006 tax rate and the one in 2007? No. Was everything recorded in Doğan books? Yes. Where is the tax evasion attempt then? It is obvious that the ministry was not after eating grapes but rather to beat the vineyard owner as the saying goes. Coupled with the boycott calls of the premier, the scenario implemented against Doğan underlines the serious mentality problem Turkey is facing. What’s at stake is not Doğan; it is freedom of thought, right to criticize and Turkish democracy itself.

Local elections are somewhat different to parliamentary elections, though the vote received by parties in the municipal assemblies represent, to a certain extent, a comprehensive and nationwide statistical data about the voter trends, thus the strength of parties. In regard to mayoral elections, however, generally the identity of the candidate, his/her reputation in the society, expertise in local administration and such factors generally play a greater role than political affiliations. It is a fact as well that candidates of the ruling party enter the local elections race more advantageous than other candidates because the electorate tends to support candidates of the ruling party in anticipation that their district might receive a higher level of central administration support if a mayor from the ruling party is brought to office. This is often the most well-kept secret. Everyone knows it, but very few talk about it. It could be argued that this is one ailment of democratic governance, but unfortunately we do not have a better alternative at hand.

Though this is a fact that most people are aware of, often because of political civility, particularly executives of the ruling party, try to stay away from "vote for our candidate, get better services" propaganda. Perhaps avoiding such talk is as well a requirement of the notion of fair election. Furthermore, voicing the "vote for our candidate, get support of the central administration" understanding might mean as well blackmailing the electorate as reading the same sentence the other way round will mean "If you do not vote for the candidate of our ruling party you will not receive support of the central government for local projects." That will be sheer blackmail, is it not?

Unfortunate for the justice minister

Recently, Justice Minister Mehmet Ali Şahin was participating at the opening of the election bureau of the ruling Justice and Development Party, or AKP, at Antalya’s Varsak district. Şahin is not a tall man. Resources of the election bureau were limited. The minister was compelled to climb a chair to address the AKP supporters attending the opening.

On the top of the chair, for some time, Şahin explained the "great accomplishments" of the AKP governance in the country and tried to answer some local questions such as what will happen to the title deeds that were cancelled or their validity were challenged at a local court on grounds that they were illegally distributed in the first place. Şahin pledged that the AKP government will legislate a new law to overcome such problems.

Then, time came to answer the questions of the local people for who they should vote in the mayoral polls? Of course local people asking such a question to an AKP minister was itself awkward, but the answer was a bizarre one which one may take on the one hand as a confession, while on the other as a reaffirmation of the non-existence of political civility in Turkish politics.

Şahin, one of the AKP ministers many people feel high respect for, was carried away with emotions. Perhaps, climbing on a chair produces complications in people suffering from high blood pressure. Whatever the reason was, Şahin started to talk out of the back of his head. "I climbed on this chair, because I wanted to see you better," he said first, then continued, "You are asking me who I advise you to vote for. It is a fact that local administrations who are on good terms with the central administration are providing far better services than those who go against us. Unfortunately, it is Turkey’s reality that local administrations who quarrel with the central administrations cannot receive support for all their projects. Thus, I would advise you to vote for candidates who are getting along well with the central government, who are getting along well with the local population, who are loyal to their state. It is a fact that resolution of most local problems require financing from the central administration. The present mayor is in very cordial dialogue with the prime minister and the prime minister is personally interested in the resolution of local problems here É"

Was what the minister said less serious than trying to buy votes through distributing coal sacks, foodstuff boxes, household appliances? Vote buying through distributing alms or through blackmailing people that if they vote for candidates who were not in allegiance to the government they would receive less support from central government must be equally criminal and must be deplored.

There is optimism among most Cyprus watchers nowadays that the island could indeed move this year toward a resolution of its over four decades-old problem. Many people are anticipating a simultaneous but separate referenda by the two peoples of the island on a Cyprus peace plan devised by Greek Cypriot leader Demetris Christofias and his Turkish counterpart, Mehmet Ali Talat. Indeed, news coming from Cyprus indicates the two leaders have almost completed discussions on the "property ownership" chapter as well and that probably by the end of April the first reading of all five chapters will be completed. There are claims as well that Turkish Cypriot leader Talat has finally secured support of the U.N. special envoy, Alexander Downer, as well as the United States and the British regarding a timetable according to which the two leaders will complete a deal by the end of August and submit in November the plan for the creation of a new partnership state on the eastern Mediterranean island to separate but simultaneous referenda of the two peoples of Cyprus.

According to this timetable, by the end of April the two leaders Ñ and at a lower level a joint team co-headed by Özdil Nami from northern Turkish Cyprus and George Iacovou of the southern Greek Cyprus Ñ will complete the first reading in all five chapters. So far, the two leaders have completed first reading in the "Matters related to governance" and "Property issues" chapters and are planning to move on within a week or so on to the "European Union matters and Economy" chapter.

After the completion of the first reading in April, there will be a short time off for Talat and Christofias during which their aides Nami and Iacovou will prepare a report on "Issues agreed," "Issues partly agreed" and "Issues where there is no convergence of views of the two sides."

The second reading by the two leaders will start in middle May and the two leaders will concentrate only on the "Issues partly agreed" and "Issues where there is no convergence of views of the two sides." The second reading will be completed by the end of August and after a short break during which a report will again be prepared by Nami and Iacovou, in early September the two leaders will engage in a give-and-take round of talks. In this last phase unlike the two meeting a week routine of the first two rounds, the two leaders will meet every day.

That final third round of discussions between the two leaders is expected to be completed by the end of October. Thus, late in November the two peoples of the island will go to the booths for a second time in five years to vote in simultaneous but separate referenda on a peace plan. If the plan written by Talat and Christofias receive support of the two peoples of the island, then a new partnership state will be established on the island.

The other side of the coin

Despite this optimistic note, however, the Greek Cypriot side has so far never accepted a timetable in the current talk’s process. Greek Cypriot leader Christofias has been stressing that there should be no time pressure on the talks and the Cypriot parties should be left to discuss an agreement under the principle "A Cypriot agreement for Cypriots."

Secondly, the Greek Cypriot side is particularly against involvement of Turkey, Greece or Britain in the process in any form even though they are the three guarantor powers. One of the aims of the talks, according to Greek Cypriots, has been to get rid of all foreign troops. Thus, one aim of the negotiations is to abrogate the 1960 guarantee system (a non-starter for Turkish Cypriots). Thirdly, the Greek Cypriot side is against a daily uninterrupted give-and-take session.

Furthermore, the 2004 plan faltered not just because of some unacceptable security arrangements or because the document allowed continued stay of some limited number of Turkish troops on the island. Rather it collapsed because Greek Cypriots refused to share power in administration on the basis of equality with Turkish Cypriots. So far there are no signs that there is a change in that approach of Greek Cypriots.

It was a slogan shared by millions in this country during the Susurluk case. We were all turning lights on and off in our houses exactly at 9 p.m. every night, meeting at city squares with candles in our hands, holding placards reading "Don’t remain silent ... If you remain silent, your turn will come as well!" At the time millions were protesting a gang (composed of politicians, bureaucrats, police officers and underground figures and which was exposed to the pubic with a traffic accident just outside the Susurluk town) within the state that was believed to be responsible for hundreds of mystery killings and disappearances while the deputy prime minister of the time, a blond lady, was proudly declaring at Parliament rostrum that those who die for the state and those who kill for the state were both heroes. On the other hand, the prime minister of the time, the then leader of the political Islam known with the reputation of "Hodja" was condemning the protests as "bulls...t."

It was an unprecedented mass protest by the nation, but the Susurluk case somehow closed down with some scapegoats being placed behind bars. Nowadays, there are efforts to re-open the case within the framework of the Ergenekon trial as well as through bringing the then top cop of the country, former minister Mehmet Ağar, in front of justice.

The "Don’t remain silent ... If you remain silent, your turn will come as well!" slogan was one strongly influenced from the "First they came" poem attributed to Pastor Martin Niemöller (1892 to 1984). That famous poem, on which I last wrote on in this column on Jan. 9, 2009, was about the inactivity of German intellectuals following the Nazi rise to power and the purging of their chosen targets, group after group.

Time to speak up!

It is as simple as that. Remaining silent to a crime makes a person an accomplice of that crime, even though the person did not actively partake in that crime. Worst, if one assumes that he has the luxury of remaining inactive to an injustice because he is not affected from that unjust development, eventually he may find out that when he himself become the victim of the same injustice there might not be anyone left to speak out.

Doğan Media Group (of which the Daily News is a member) was shocked this week with a fine imposed on it by the Finance Ministry. Although the Doğan group documented that it sold 25 percent of the shares of Doğan TV to the German Axel Springer on Jan. 2, 2007, the Finance Ministry imposed on Doğan a 869 million Turkish Liras ($500 million) fine and charged that the holding was involved in tax evasion (a charge that annihilates the probability of Doğan negotiating a deal with the ministry over the fine) on grounds that the sale was done three months earlier, in 2006, but was reported in 2007 and thus the state lost in tax revenues.

Since the sale was documented in Doğan’s books and since the actual handover of shares indeed took place on Jan. 2, 2007 and since under current Turkish laws share sales are exempt from value added tax, the charges are all baseless and eventually hopefully will be declared as such by the court. What the ministry is trying to do under instructions from the government (Doğan records were started to be investigated three days after the closure case against the ruling Justice and Development Party, or AKP, was filed with the Constitutional Court while the announcement) is not to punish the Doğan group but to extinguish it all together, as was done earlier against the Uzan and the Dinç Bilgin groups, and party done against the Karamehmet group.

Except the Star TV of the Uzans, both Uzan and Bilgin group media were being taken over by people in allegiance with the AKP government and they were converted into partisan media. Now, the target of AKP is to kill the Doğan group and the henchmen are acting on orders of the government, while the prime minister is calling on the nation at every opportunity not to let the media critical of him and his government into their homes.

Today, it is Doğan Media Group’s turn to be eradicated, or at least silenced. Who knows who and which media outlet will be placed on the bull’s eye next. And, the premier is still boasting that Turkey has advanced and is no longer a country where journalists, writers were persecuted. Worst, there are still people in Turkey and abroad who still believe in this bad joke and can talk about a democrat prime minister, a democratic governance in Turkey!