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The internationalization problem of Turkey-Armenia talks
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Before proceeding with the current situation, let’s first put a brief late history of the Turkish-Armenian normalization process. After some unfruitful meetings between the foreign ministers of Turkey and Armenia, namely Abdullah Gül and Vartan Oskanian in 2003 and 2004 on the margins of international summits, Turkey officially proposed in 2005 to Armenia the establishment of a joint commission composed of historians and experts from both countries to study the incidents of 1915.
The mastermind of the proposal, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, repeatedly said Turkey would accept the scientific results of the study, adding the country was sure of itself and its history.
In response to the Turkish proposal, former Armenian President Robert Kocharian, a hardliner, offered Turkey to set up an intergovernmental commission to study not only the incidents of 1915 but also the ways to restore diplomatic ties and open the border.
This exchange of proposals did not produce an imminent breakthrough but obviously helped create a suitable environment for both countries to move forward. Especially Armenia’s proposal of broadening the scope and mission of the joint commissions was seen as a good start.
Even though Turkey was initially aiming to nix the recognition of 1915 mass killings as genocide by third countries’ parliaments, especially by the United States House of Representatives, the process has matured afterward. Between 2006 and 2008, diplomats from the two countries held a series of secret talks in various cities in Europe and worked on the modalities of the establishment of these commissions. This course of silent diplomacy turned into a "public diplomacy" only after Turkey and Armenia’s national teams found themselves in the same qualifying group for the 2010 World Football Championship.
On Sept 5, last year, President Abdullah Gül paid a landmark visit to Yerevan to watch the match upon the invitation of his Armenian counterpart Serge Sarkisian. Gül and Sarkisian met more than two hours and instructed their foreign ministers to continue to talks over the night. Both sides seemed satisfied of the content of the meetings and hinted "talks at the technical and diplomatic level will continue."
No doubt, Gül and other Turkish officials were informing Azerbaijan about the meetings, probably assuring them Ankara will not take any steps that would hurt the interests of Baku with regard to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
The election of Barack Obama as the president of the U.S. and the strengthened democratic majority in the House did raise concerns here and at the same time led to speeding up the process.
That’s why the expectations that between March 29, the local elections, and April 24, the day that commemorates the events in 1915, the parties will declare "a document," a protocol or memorandum or understanding or anything written, to show their commitment to finalizing the talks. Obama’s visit to Turkey had also an important effect on the rise of these expectations and also criticisms from Azerbaijan.
In the light of Foreign Minister Ali Babacan’s last week visit to Yerevan, one can assume that "there will be no an easy breakthrough on the Armenian-Turkey front." Here are some reasons for that:
First is the indispensably internationalization of the bilateral efforts. Turkey and Armenia started this process on their own and improved it a lot. Obama’s meeting with Turkish and Armenian foreign ministers in Istanbul and his expostulatory statements did obviously result in the inclusion of Washington to the process.
Concerned by the American intrusion, Azerbaijan rushed to get Russian support to block Turkey to reconcile with Armenia before the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute is settled. Azerbaijan also threatened Turkey and rest of Europe to nix their plans to build the Nabucco pipeline, a project that would save Europe from its dependency to Russia.
The second point was the Turkish government’s failure in keeping two tracks, the Turkish-Armenian and Nagorno-Karabakh peace talks, parallel. In January, Azerbaijan openly expressed its discomfort with the fact that Turkish-Armenian process was going well ahead of the Nagorno-Karabakh efforts and that could cause real problems. Additionally, when approached to open border with Turkey, there would be not many incentives for Armenia to compromise in the Nagorno-Karabakh talks. This is the point where Turkey lost control and left it to the flow of developments, mainly directed from the United States.
Consequently, Turkish-Armenian reconciliation will have to wait until the Nagorno-Karabakh problem is solved. It’s in fact an obligation of a coherent foreign policy to wait until the removal of the cause that led to seal the border with Armenia in 1993.
In response to the Turkish proposal, former Armenian President Robert Kocharian, a hardliner, offered Turkey to set up an intergovernmental commission to study not only the incidents of 1915 but also the ways to restore diplomatic ties and open the border.
This exchange of proposals did not produce an imminent breakthrough but obviously helped create a suitable environment for both countries to move forward. Especially Armenia’s proposal of broadening the scope and mission of the joint commissions was seen as a good start.
Even though Turkey was initially aiming to nix the recognition of 1915 mass killings as genocide by third countries’ parliaments, especially by the United States House of Representatives, the process has matured afterward. Between 2006 and 2008, diplomats from the two countries held a series of secret talks in various cities in Europe and worked on the modalities of the establishment of these commissions. This course of silent diplomacy turned into a "public diplomacy" only after Turkey and Armenia’s national teams found themselves in the same qualifying group for the 2010 World Football Championship.
On Sept 5, last year, President Abdullah Gül paid a landmark visit to Yerevan to watch the match upon the invitation of his Armenian counterpart Serge Sarkisian. Gül and Sarkisian met more than two hours and instructed their foreign ministers to continue to talks over the night. Both sides seemed satisfied of the content of the meetings and hinted "talks at the technical and diplomatic level will continue."
No doubt, Gül and other Turkish officials were informing Azerbaijan about the meetings, probably assuring them Ankara will not take any steps that would hurt the interests of Baku with regard to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
The election of Barack Obama as the president of the U.S. and the strengthened democratic majority in the House did raise concerns here and at the same time led to speeding up the process.
That’s why the expectations that between March 29, the local elections, and April 24, the day that commemorates the events in 1915, the parties will declare "a document," a protocol or memorandum or understanding or anything written, to show their commitment to finalizing the talks. Obama’s visit to Turkey had also an important effect on the rise of these expectations and also criticisms from Azerbaijan.
In the light of Foreign Minister Ali Babacan’s last week visit to Yerevan, one can assume that "there will be no an easy breakthrough on the Armenian-Turkey front." Here are some reasons for that:
First is the indispensably internationalization of the bilateral efforts. Turkey and Armenia started this process on their own and improved it a lot. Obama’s meeting with Turkish and Armenian foreign ministers in Istanbul and his expostulatory statements did obviously result in the inclusion of Washington to the process.
Concerned by the American intrusion, Azerbaijan rushed to get Russian support to block Turkey to reconcile with Armenia before the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute is settled. Azerbaijan also threatened Turkey and rest of Europe to nix their plans to build the Nabucco pipeline, a project that would save Europe from its dependency to Russia.
The second point was the Turkish government’s failure in keeping two tracks, the Turkish-Armenian and Nagorno-Karabakh peace talks, parallel. In January, Azerbaijan openly expressed its discomfort with the fact that Turkish-Armenian process was going well ahead of the Nagorno-Karabakh efforts and that could cause real problems. Additionally, when approached to open border with Turkey, there would be not many incentives for Armenia to compromise in the Nagorno-Karabakh talks. This is the point where Turkey lost control and left it to the flow of developments, mainly directed from the United States.
Consequently, Turkish-Armenian reconciliation will have to wait until the Nagorno-Karabakh problem is solved. It’s in fact an obligation of a coherent foreign policy to wait until the removal of the cause that led to seal the border with Armenia in 1993.
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