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Turkey in 2019 (I)
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In a country like Turkey, which has been going through a fast transformation ever since the restoration of civilian rule in 1983 after the last full-fledged military takeover of 1980, it is not at all easy to comfortably predict what the country will look like 10 years from now. Besides the fact that Turkey is a very dynamic country of constant change, the international and regional climate will play a role as to which way the Turkish transformation will head.
Will the Islamization of the state administration succeed? Can Turkey accommodate an advanced degree of Islamization in an administration with the rules and norms of democracy based on the supremacy of law and secularism? Will the "white capital" continue to dominate the Turkish economy, or will the advancing "green capital" succeed in overtaking the leadership of business life in this country?
Was is possible at the beginning of 1989 that by the end of that year the Iron Wall would collapse and East Germany would become history, and within a few years the mighty Soviet Empire would disintegrate peacefully, new republics would emerge, and a new political map of Europe and Eurasia would come into being? Or after seeing the peaceful dissolution of the Soviet Empire, would anyone believe it if someone had said in 1990 that the process of disintegrating former Yugoslavia would involve so much bloodshed, so much pain and so many heinous, genocidal acts? Once transformation starts, it is difficult to estimate what the outcome will be.
In Turkey’s case, however, answers to some key issues may provide a photo, though a very blurred one, of the Turkey in the making.
Some fundamental questions
The first question might be whether Turkey can develop a new understanding regarding secularism and whether it can become a really secular republic. It is obvious that there are problems in the perception of secularism of today’s Turkish state. On one hand, there is a government-funded Religious Affairs Directorate, which has a countrywide structure far bigger than that of six or seven ministries combined. What does the directorate do? It establishes state control over religion, or to be more precise, on the Sunni-Hanafi school of Islam. Through the directorate, budgetary funds are provided for the teaching and practice of Hanafi school of Islam. Including Alevism, to which some 20 percent of Turks subscribe to, other Islamic schools and orders as well as other religions were ignored. But the state is secular, and Islamic signs have no place in the public sphere, including universities. To say the least, this is sheer deception.
Thus, if Turkey manages to develop an "inclusive" and "non-deceptive" understanding of secularism and reorganizes the state in a manner which the Turkish state would remain equidistant from all religions, allow its citizens to decide with their free will which religion they want to subscribe to, lift all restrictions on the individual’s freedom of religion but strictly bar signs and symbols of all religions at public offices, Turkey may get rid of many religion/secularism discussions and tensions while individuals enjoy their freedom of belief. Turbans and other religious symbols will no longer be a source of tension in such a Turkey. Though we are confident that some other ways of exploiting religion will be found by political Islam, in such a Turkey we may have a higher chance of keeping religion a private, individual matter rather than today’s gross exploitation and revanchist campaign. If we fail to achieve this, unfortunately the future will be gloomier than today.
A second question might be whether we will be able to resolve the Kurdish issue without disrupting the national and territorial integrity of the country or whether we let it haunt us forever. We may pretend that we are aiming to resolve this very important problem with some palliative moves and thus continue to fool ourselves. Or, we may realize that as long as a portion of our society continues to be deprived of their fundamental rights and feel as second-class citizens, fighting terrorism will not be enough to resolve the problem or to maintain Turkey’s integrity.
Obviously, we need to change the mind-set. If and when an ethnic Kurd enjoys the same rights and liberties enjoyed by an ethnic Turk and the alienation process is replaced with an integration process, we may be able to talk about a happier Turkey.
Was is possible at the beginning of 1989 that by the end of that year the Iron Wall would collapse and East Germany would become history, and within a few years the mighty Soviet Empire would disintegrate peacefully, new republics would emerge, and a new political map of Europe and Eurasia would come into being? Or after seeing the peaceful dissolution of the Soviet Empire, would anyone believe it if someone had said in 1990 that the process of disintegrating former Yugoslavia would involve so much bloodshed, so much pain and so many heinous, genocidal acts? Once transformation starts, it is difficult to estimate what the outcome will be.
In Turkey’s case, however, answers to some key issues may provide a photo, though a very blurred one, of the Turkey in the making.
Some fundamental questions
The first question might be whether Turkey can develop a new understanding regarding secularism and whether it can become a really secular republic. It is obvious that there are problems in the perception of secularism of today’s Turkish state. On one hand, there is a government-funded Religious Affairs Directorate, which has a countrywide structure far bigger than that of six or seven ministries combined. What does the directorate do? It establishes state control over religion, or to be more precise, on the Sunni-Hanafi school of Islam. Through the directorate, budgetary funds are provided for the teaching and practice of Hanafi school of Islam. Including Alevism, to which some 20 percent of Turks subscribe to, other Islamic schools and orders as well as other religions were ignored. But the state is secular, and Islamic signs have no place in the public sphere, including universities. To say the least, this is sheer deception.
Thus, if Turkey manages to develop an "inclusive" and "non-deceptive" understanding of secularism and reorganizes the state in a manner which the Turkish state would remain equidistant from all religions, allow its citizens to decide with their free will which religion they want to subscribe to, lift all restrictions on the individual’s freedom of religion but strictly bar signs and symbols of all religions at public offices, Turkey may get rid of many religion/secularism discussions and tensions while individuals enjoy their freedom of belief. Turbans and other religious symbols will no longer be a source of tension in such a Turkey. Though we are confident that some other ways of exploiting religion will be found by political Islam, in such a Turkey we may have a higher chance of keeping religion a private, individual matter rather than today’s gross exploitation and revanchist campaign. If we fail to achieve this, unfortunately the future will be gloomier than today.
A second question might be whether we will be able to resolve the Kurdish issue without disrupting the national and territorial integrity of the country or whether we let it haunt us forever. We may pretend that we are aiming to resolve this very important problem with some palliative moves and thus continue to fool ourselves. Or, we may realize that as long as a portion of our society continues to be deprived of their fundamental rights and feel as second-class citizens, fighting terrorism will not be enough to resolve the problem or to maintain Turkey’s integrity.
Obviously, we need to change the mind-set. If and when an ethnic Kurd enjoys the same rights and liberties enjoyed by an ethnic Turk and the alienation process is replaced with an integration process, we may be able to talk about a happier Turkey.
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