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The prerequisite
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Great expectations have been created once again as if there will be a magical resolution to the Kurdish problem tomorrow. If these great expectations, created partly by the president and the ruling Justice and Development Party, or AKP, and some leading writers in the Turkish media, are not moderated and replaced with some attainable targets, however, they may soon cause the country great disappointment that may further complicate the already very complicated problem.
Some pundits have started calling for an undeclared "cease-fire" by the separatist Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, and the Turkish military. Some are even calling for the start of a "discreet dialogue" between the Turkish state and the separatist gang immediately after "both sides" silenced their guns.
Who are the two sides?
Do we indeed have "two sides" in this problem? Is the PKK a terrorist gang or a guerilla force with some legitimacy that we can consider as a "side" that has opened some sort of a "war" on the Turkish state? Who are those "two sides" required to "silence their guns" simultaneously so that a "political way out" can be implemented to resolve the Kurdish problem? Are the some 2.5 million voters who voted for the pro-PKK Democratic Society Party, or DTP, the "other side" that the Turkish state should consider as a counterpart? If so, are the DTP, or the DTP mayors elected in some 100 southeastern cities, towns and districts, the representatives of the "other side" that the Turkish state should engage in discreet dialogue? Or, has Turkey accepted the recent suggestion by a PKK chieftain that the Turkish state should engage in a dialogue with a group of "wise men"? How will that group of "wise men" be composed?
Obviously finding a political way out or bringing an end through "civilian initiatives" to the almost 30 years of the separatist campaign that has claimed almost 40,000 lives since 1984 cannot be opposed by anyone aspiring to see an end to the bloodshed in this country. Definitely, irrespective of whether the son was lost on the mountain fighting with the government forces or lost in the fight against the terrorists, they are all our sons, and mothers feel the same pain for their lost sons. This pain must be stopped.
The domestic and external conditions might also be ripe for a civilian initiative to end the bloodshed. The government might have political will for such an undertaking and there might be a consensus between the government and the Turkish military that some non-military measures should be applied. But what miracle prescription do we have to believe that a civilian initiative can indeed succeed? Is not there a danger that while trying to resolve the problem through civilian means we may end up providing legitimacy to the separatist gang and face a bigger and more serious separatist threat tomorrow?
Obviously, the Kurdish problem is nothing new. Putting an end to it through only military measures may help only to contain it for some time until it flares up one day again. It is a must to find a resolution that while on one hand should meet the expectations of the ethnic Turkish population of the country and thus dry the breeding ground of the PKK, while on the other hand should not compromise the country’s national and territorial integrity.
Where to start?
But, where Turkey should start? Shall we start by scrapping the gigantic "How happy is the one who calls himself a Turk" inscriptions on the mountains overlooking some cities of the Southeast? Or, shall we put some more prisoners in the İmrali prison and bring an end to the solitude of PKK chieftain Abdullah Öcalan, serving an enforced life term. Or, shall we open a second Kurdish channel on the state-owned TRT? What?
Of course silencing the arms should be the first move. If the guns are silenced, it will become easier to consider moves that, if we suggested them today, could land us in prison on charges of violating the anti-terror law. But, how can guns be stopped?
Obviously, the move must come from the PKK itself. The prerequisite of success of any civilian initiative in resolving the Kurdish problem is the PKK silencing its guns unconditionally and without awaiting reciprocity from the Turkish military. The military cannot enter a deal with a group of terrorists, but why should it fire if there is no threat?
Can the PKK undertake that move?
Who are the two sides?
Do we indeed have "two sides" in this problem? Is the PKK a terrorist gang or a guerilla force with some legitimacy that we can consider as a "side" that has opened some sort of a "war" on the Turkish state? Who are those "two sides" required to "silence their guns" simultaneously so that a "political way out" can be implemented to resolve the Kurdish problem? Are the some 2.5 million voters who voted for the pro-PKK Democratic Society Party, or DTP, the "other side" that the Turkish state should consider as a counterpart? If so, are the DTP, or the DTP mayors elected in some 100 southeastern cities, towns and districts, the representatives of the "other side" that the Turkish state should engage in discreet dialogue? Or, has Turkey accepted the recent suggestion by a PKK chieftain that the Turkish state should engage in a dialogue with a group of "wise men"? How will that group of "wise men" be composed?
Obviously finding a political way out or bringing an end through "civilian initiatives" to the almost 30 years of the separatist campaign that has claimed almost 40,000 lives since 1984 cannot be opposed by anyone aspiring to see an end to the bloodshed in this country. Definitely, irrespective of whether the son was lost on the mountain fighting with the government forces or lost in the fight against the terrorists, they are all our sons, and mothers feel the same pain for their lost sons. This pain must be stopped.
The domestic and external conditions might also be ripe for a civilian initiative to end the bloodshed. The government might have political will for such an undertaking and there might be a consensus between the government and the Turkish military that some non-military measures should be applied. But what miracle prescription do we have to believe that a civilian initiative can indeed succeed? Is not there a danger that while trying to resolve the problem through civilian means we may end up providing legitimacy to the separatist gang and face a bigger and more serious separatist threat tomorrow?
Obviously, the Kurdish problem is nothing new. Putting an end to it through only military measures may help only to contain it for some time until it flares up one day again. It is a must to find a resolution that while on one hand should meet the expectations of the ethnic Turkish population of the country and thus dry the breeding ground of the PKK, while on the other hand should not compromise the country’s national and territorial integrity.
Where to start?
But, where Turkey should start? Shall we start by scrapping the gigantic "How happy is the one who calls himself a Turk" inscriptions on the mountains overlooking some cities of the Southeast? Or, shall we put some more prisoners in the İmrali prison and bring an end to the solitude of PKK chieftain Abdullah Öcalan, serving an enforced life term. Or, shall we open a second Kurdish channel on the state-owned TRT? What?
Of course silencing the arms should be the first move. If the guns are silenced, it will become easier to consider moves that, if we suggested them today, could land us in prison on charges of violating the anti-terror law. But, how can guns be stopped?
Obviously, the move must come from the PKK itself. The prerequisite of success of any civilian initiative in resolving the Kurdish problem is the PKK silencing its guns unconditionally and without awaiting reciprocity from the Turkish military. The military cannot enter a deal with a group of terrorists, but why should it fire if there is no threat?
Can the PKK undertake that move?
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