As we would expect from him, apparently, President Abdullah Gül has put an end to the discussions on whether his term in office is five or seven years, by agreeing to go with the five-year term description in the amended constitution and asked Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan not to include a proposal to increase the presidential term to seven.
Consequently, Erdoğan appears to have not only accepted the request of the president but decided to also drop the consideration of increasing the parliamentary to five years.
Both ideas were absurd anyhow. How the ruling AKP would explain to the nation why they reduced both presidential and parliamentary terms in the run up to the 2007 parliamentary elections and why they are now trying to restore them back to the pre-amended periods? By deciding to give up such amendment demands the AKP has at least eradicated two contentious discussion subjects from the apparently crowded web of problematic constitutional amendment proposals, headed by a rather legitimate idea of rendering party closures by the Constitutional Court so difficult that in reality party closures will come to a de facto end.
Castrated AKP
While there appears to be a consensus in the country that whatever extensive amendments are being made in the text of the 1983 military-scissored current constitution the anti-democratic spirit of it cannot be eradicated in full, it is a fact as well that particularly after the Constitutional Court’s annulment of the amendment package aimed at allowing headscarves in universities and after the AKP was condemned by the Constitutional Court as a "focus of anti-secular activities" (tough it narrowly escaped closure thanks to the qualified majority requirement), the AKP’s constitutional amendment capability, irrespective of its parliamentary strength, is unfortunately castrated.
Naturally, the AKP’s Burhan Kuzu was complaining this week that if a new constitution, or at least a comprehensive constitutional amendment, was required but if the present Parliament was incapable of undertaking such a constitutional reform because of refusal of the opposition parties (to approve the package and thus provide legitimacy to AKP’s drive), then should Turkey go on "coup prayers" and hope that this time the coup administration stays for just a brief period to write a new constitution and return to the barracks without harming Turkish democracy too much?
This was of course a valid question and a very appropriate joke reflecting the dilemma the country has been brought to by the wrong moves of the AKP governance. But, we can at least say that there is at least one person in the AKP who has realized that unless the AKP establishes a consensus with the opposition parties on the set of amendments it would like to make in the constitutional text it just cannot do it alone. If Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan shelves for some time his aggressive and rejectionist style towards the opposition, perhaps we may finally capture a probability to undertake a comprehensive reform even if we are very much aware that whatever changes might be done, the 1983 Constitution will still have some anti-democratic elements or some articles that are still open to interpretation by some judges with an anti-democratic perspective.
Non-partisan constituent assembly
Indeed, what Turkey needs is to gather a new nonpartisan consultative assembly with an all-inclusive understanding and which in collaboration with the universities and civil society would write and suggest to Parliament a new national charter. Can we do it? Unfortunately as long as the AKP continues to believe in majoritarianism rather than pluralism; insists in considering "compromise" as "giving in" to the demands of the opposition; remains preoccupied with finding a formula to cascade the party closure power of the top court; convert it into a tool of the parliamentary majority and dilute its importance through increasing the number of judges on the one hand and allowing right of individual application on the other, it will be difficult for the opposition parties in getting engaged in a constitutional reform move together with the AKP. Can the AKP change? Can Erdoğan change? Can the AKP convince the opposition that it gave up majoritarianism and started to subscribe to pluralism? Can the AKP convince its opponents that it is after reform that goes beyond preventing a possible new closure case against it?