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A deal with Armenia
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Turkey and Azerbaijan are "two states, one nation," as former President Süleyman Demirel and his Azerbaijani counterpart, late Haydar Aliyev, often said. The two nations have common ethnic and linguistic backgrounds.
The pleasures and grief of Turkey are the pleasures and grief of Azerbaijan and vice versa. Furthermore, Turkey has a rather large Azerbaijani Turkish minority. Anatolian Turks feel at home in Azerbaijan, and Azerbaijanis feel at home in Turkey, proving correct Aliyev and Demirel’s "one nation, two states" remarks.
Last Monday, Cansu Çamlibel of the Hurriyet Daily News penned an excellent report on the prospects of Turkey and Armenia signing a protocol that would mark commitment by both sides to establish diplomatic relations and set up committees on issues ranging from border management, customs, history and more. According to Çamlıbel, Ankara, which achieved a satisfying deal that included setting up a history committee to discuss the contentious 1915 events on which Yerevan dragged its feet for a long time, was now facing a dilemma of when to announce the deal with Armenia. After Çamlıbel’s pioneering report, on Thursday and Friday some interesting reports appeared in the U.S. media. First, on Thursday, the prestigious Wall Street Journal reported that Ankara and Yerevan might sign a protocol that would open the border between the two countries.
Then, on Friday, the Washington Times reported that after two years of secret talks, the two countries were nearing agreement on a sweeping package that included opening the common border closed since Armenia’s 1993 occupation of Azerbaijan’s predominantly Armenian-populated Nagorno-Karabakh district, diplomatic relations and a bilateral intergovernmental commission on issues ranging from taxes and public health to history, including the 1915 events. The Washington Times reported that Turkey was also expected to issue a "road map" on a solution for Nagorno-Karabakh.
The continued Armenian occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh; references to "greater Armenia" in the Armenian declaration of independence and annex of its constitution that imply territorial claims from Turkey; and efforts by Armenia and its diaspora to get the 1915 events recognized by world parliaments as a "genocide" have been the impediments to progress in Turkish-Armenian relations.
As was explained above, the Turkish-Armenian border, which was opened after the Turkey’s 1991 recognition of the independence of the Armenian state, was closed in 1993 after Armenian aggression on Azerbaijan and occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh. Repeated efforts to normalize relations, open the border and establish full diplomatic relations have all failed in the past because of last-minute moves at some third party parliaments toward recognizing the 1915 events as "genocide." Now, Turkey is under pressure to make a deal with Armenia, at least open the border and avert recognition of 1915 as "genocide" by the American Congress as new President Barack Obama pledged several dozen times during the campaign that he would take that step, which would seriously jeopardize relations with Ankara.
Hostage of what?
A Turkish-Armenian deal, on the other hand, would traumatize Turkish-Azerbaijani relations despite the strong "one nation, two states" bond between the two countries. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, whose country already has complaints from the low pricing of its energy exports to Turkey, has warned Ankara that Baku would cut natural gas supplies to Turkey if Ankara reached an agreement with Armenia before substantial progress was under way on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. A March 27 memorandum of understanding between the Russian and Azerbaijani energy companies paved the way for Russia to gain controlling influence over Azerbaijan’s natural gas exports on the one hand and provided Baku an opportunity to sell its gas at international market rates on the other. Under the memorandum, if everything goes as planned, Baku could be shipping the bulk of its gas via Russia by 2010.
There is also headway in Armenia-Azerbaijani diplomacy, and the two countries might be very close in making a deal over Nagorno-Karabakh. But before such a deal is done, how wise will it be for Ankara to act with a "we shall not be a hostage of Nagorno-Karabakh dispute" mentality and become a hostage of the "Armenian bill in the U.S. Congress" blackmail at the expense of hurting Azerbaijan and perhaps further endangering our energy supply?
Last Monday, Cansu Çamlibel of the Hurriyet Daily News penned an excellent report on the prospects of Turkey and Armenia signing a protocol that would mark commitment by both sides to establish diplomatic relations and set up committees on issues ranging from border management, customs, history and more. According to Çamlıbel, Ankara, which achieved a satisfying deal that included setting up a history committee to discuss the contentious 1915 events on which Yerevan dragged its feet for a long time, was now facing a dilemma of when to announce the deal with Armenia. After Çamlıbel’s pioneering report, on Thursday and Friday some interesting reports appeared in the U.S. media. First, on Thursday, the prestigious Wall Street Journal reported that Ankara and Yerevan might sign a protocol that would open the border between the two countries.
Then, on Friday, the Washington Times reported that after two years of secret talks, the two countries were nearing agreement on a sweeping package that included opening the common border closed since Armenia’s 1993 occupation of Azerbaijan’s predominantly Armenian-populated Nagorno-Karabakh district, diplomatic relations and a bilateral intergovernmental commission on issues ranging from taxes and public health to history, including the 1915 events. The Washington Times reported that Turkey was also expected to issue a "road map" on a solution for Nagorno-Karabakh.
The continued Armenian occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh; references to "greater Armenia" in the Armenian declaration of independence and annex of its constitution that imply territorial claims from Turkey; and efforts by Armenia and its diaspora to get the 1915 events recognized by world parliaments as a "genocide" have been the impediments to progress in Turkish-Armenian relations.
As was explained above, the Turkish-Armenian border, which was opened after the Turkey’s 1991 recognition of the independence of the Armenian state, was closed in 1993 after Armenian aggression on Azerbaijan and occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh. Repeated efforts to normalize relations, open the border and establish full diplomatic relations have all failed in the past because of last-minute moves at some third party parliaments toward recognizing the 1915 events as "genocide." Now, Turkey is under pressure to make a deal with Armenia, at least open the border and avert recognition of 1915 as "genocide" by the American Congress as new President Barack Obama pledged several dozen times during the campaign that he would take that step, which would seriously jeopardize relations with Ankara.
Hostage of what?
A Turkish-Armenian deal, on the other hand, would traumatize Turkish-Azerbaijani relations despite the strong "one nation, two states" bond between the two countries. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, whose country already has complaints from the low pricing of its energy exports to Turkey, has warned Ankara that Baku would cut natural gas supplies to Turkey if Ankara reached an agreement with Armenia before substantial progress was under way on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. A March 27 memorandum of understanding between the Russian and Azerbaijani energy companies paved the way for Russia to gain controlling influence over Azerbaijan’s natural gas exports on the one hand and provided Baku an opportunity to sell its gas at international market rates on the other. Under the memorandum, if everything goes as planned, Baku could be shipping the bulk of its gas via Russia by 2010.
There is also headway in Armenia-Azerbaijani diplomacy, and the two countries might be very close in making a deal over Nagorno-Karabakh. But before such a deal is done, how wise will it be for Ankara to act with a "we shall not be a hostage of Nagorno-Karabakh dispute" mentality and become a hostage of the "Armenian bill in the U.S. Congress" blackmail at the expense of hurting Azerbaijan and perhaps further endangering our energy supply?
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