Yusuf Kanlı

The "international fight against terrorism" sure gained a new dimension last weekend with the inclusion of yet another "lethal weapon" the "terrorists" might resort to in their attacks on "civilized" targets... Even though one may question how "civilized" the target of a pair of shoes hurled at a Baghdad press conference room last weekend was and probably reporters will soon start being admitted into press conference rooms in bare feet.

Video footage of the event showed outgoing U.S. President George W. Bush was apparently quite skilled in ducking down and successfully evaded the "shoe assault" launched at him. Yet, the event did not stop reporters at the American president’s next stop in Kabul to exchange jokes amongst themselves about whether taking of shoes and entering the press conference room has become a requirement of presidential security measures.Throwing shoes, indeed slippers, at nasty kids - without really aiming at them - has been a rather accustomed tradition of particularly the nannies or elder ladies of the families. As one of those nasty kids who often came under "slipper fire", I remember collecting the slippers thrown at me and burning them…Among the adults, there is also an insult in Turkish slang: "Kiss the bottom of my shoe!" It more or less is equivalent of the English slang of "kiss my..." and implies strong disapproval and discontent of someone. However, according to an Associated Press report - which recalled that Iraqis whacked a statue of Saddam with their shoes after U.S. marines toppled it to the ground following the 2003 invasion - throwing a shoe at someone was a sign of contempt.As a person in whose competence of extraordinary understanding and intellectual skills there is a universal consensus, it was rather easy for Bush to degrade the degrading shoe salvo at him as nothing significant. He reportedly just brushed off the incident and said, "So what if a guy threw his shoe at me?"Anyhow, is it much different than how we react each time when Bush or some other American officials talk about "victory" in Iraq? As people who do not have the luxury of closing our eyes to the developments in Iraq, the bitter democratization sufferings of the Iraqi people under the boots of the occupying U.S. troops and their local collaborators, we have developed the skill of just ignoring all claims of "big American success" in Iraq as just empty talk... The reality on land testifies to what the U.S. achieved in Iraq and at what cost!Farewell to ’Mr. No’At the age of 21 he was a member of the youth branch of the notorious EOKA gang, the Greek Cypriot underground organization aimed at kicking the colonial British administration out of Cyprus and unite the eastern Mediterranean island with Greece.At the age of 24 he not only had become the leader of the youth branch of EOKA, but also the labor minister in the first post-independence government led by Archbishop Makarios. For 12 years he served as minister in Makarios governments, while at the same time ascended the ladders of power in the EOKA gang to become one of the ideologists of the criminal group that had started in 1963 aiming at annihilating Turkish Cypriots - the major obstacle in front of achieving "enosis" - union with Greece. He was one of the authors of the failed Akritas plan, which was put into implementation on Dec. 21, 1963 and according to which, Turkish Cypriots were to be annihilated in 24 hours. Papadopoulos was as well the "launderer" of the "dirty money" of some "former" communists, like Slobodan Milosevic.When he was elected president of the Greek Cypriot-run Cyprus Republic in 2003 a UN peace plan for the island was in completion stage. He effectively fought it, rightly earned the title of "Mr No" and convinced his people to reject the plan at an April 24, 2004 referendum, but despite his arrogant and anti-peace policies, the EU granted his government full membership and left the Turkish Cypriots, who overwhelmingly accepted the peace plan, out in the cold. Last year he lost elections to incumbent Demetrios Christofias... Last Friday, he lost his battle against lung cancer, though he was successful earlier in the fight against larynx cancer and colon cancer.His death reduced by one those who oppose a settlement on the island...

Last week was a very busy week for the European Union and some Turkish diplomats attending the meetings in Brussels while Turkey and the rest of the Muslim world was on an extended Sacrifice holiday... Apart from discussing and adopting a decision offering Ireland a set of concessions -- including guarantees that Ireland could keep a permanent seat on the EU's executive body, the European Commission -- so it will hold a new referendum on the EU's stalled Lisbon Treaty, first the European foreign ministers and later the EU leaders bitterly criticized Turkey of slowing down its EU-oriented reform process and expressed disappointment over this.

While Ireland agreed with the "guaranteed seat on the Commission" concession offered and Prime Minister Briand Cowen pledged to hold a new vote by October on the Lisbon Treaty -- a key document which was rejected by the Irish voters earlier this year not only aims to make the 27-nation bloc a stronger player on the world stage but carries a crucial importance for countries in the accession talks process, Croatia and Turkey, as the bloc’s enlargement requires its enactment -- Turkish leaders, as always, preferred to brush aside the complaints with a "reforms are continuing" cliché... However, it was not only the European foreign ministers and leaders who complained in Brussels that there was a serious letup in the Turkish reform drive, many Turks who have been aspiring to see European norms and values coming to life in Turkey have been even more seriously critical of the slowdown of the reform process in the country since the 2005 Leyla Şahin verdict of the European Court of Human Rights -- declaring the ban on Islamist headgear compatible with the Turkish Constitution and thus not a violation of human rights - or since the 2006 start of the accession talks process... Over the past week, as guests of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, Professor Ahmet Evin of the Sabancı University, Cem Toker, the chairman of the Liberal Democrat Party, or LDP, of Turkey and this writer had the opportunity to come together with local and federal politicians, bureaucrats, academicians, and students at several German cities for an assessment of "Turkey’s march" toward the EU over the past year period. While European leaders were very much concerned particularly with the failure of Turkey to implement the additional protocol to the Ankara Agreement -- opening Turkish ports and airports to the Greek Cypriots -- and called on the Turkish government to take urgent measures in that direction and to normalize its relationship with the Greek Cypriot administration.Reform: Son killed, father persecuted under 301 For example, could continued police violence compatible with the EU process? If 48 Turks fell victim to police bullets or "ill treatment" at police stations or at detention places or prisons over the past three years or since, with a "deform" police was given the right "shoot to kill" three years ago? Or, was it at all compatible with the EU norms for a father whose son fell victim to a police bullet -- just because he did not obey an order to stop his car -- and in the pain of losing his son he cried "State killed my son" is now facing prosecution under the notorious Penal Code Article 301 -- that regulates penalties against defaming the Turkish nation... The justice minister might be determined not to let anyone curse at the Turkish state and get away with it, but can you explain that to the hearth of a father who lost his son to a police bullet? Or, can we say that the government, which is preparing to make an amendment in the public tenders law for a 17th time is in line with the pledges of transparency in administration? What about the ombudsman law? Has anyone heard about abolishing of military courts or at least stopping civilians facing military courts? The justice minister and his undersecretary are still members of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors, the top body that decides postings, promotions and punishments for the judges and prosecutors. There has been no reform in the elections law and the 10 percent threshold, or in the law on political parties that allow tyrant party leaders. Violation of freedom of press continue... But the premier and the foreign minister say Turkey is committed to the reform process and indeed the process is continuing... We love fairy tales, but the fact is 2008 was as well a lost year on the path to EU...

The sides on the island have already agreed on the general outlines of what are the powers of the federal administration, which includes relations with the European Union, foreign and defense policies, monetary policies, taxation, the central bank, migration policies, federal crimes -- terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime, money laundering and such -- natural resources, maritime and aviation affairs and such. However, on the specifics of most of these headings the two sides still have rather contrasting positions, such as who owns the airports and ports, future of the existing two flight information region, or FIRs, the power of the constituent states to engage in international contacts and sign separate agreements. The sides have no agreement on the functions and powers of the central bank either. Furthermore, while the Turkish side defends that all sovereign powers apart from those the sides agree to transfer to the new federal administration - that is residual sovereignty - should rest with the two constituent states. Greek Cypriots, however, refuse to talk on residual sovereignty, saying such matters can come up only sides reach full agreement on issues pertaining to federal sovereignty.

Also, while the Turkish Cypriot side demands that under the "subsidiarity" principle application of some federal legislation should be left to the constituent states, the Greek Cypriot side refuses the "subsidiarity" principle all together and say it will be in the discretion of the federal government to decide to leave application of which laws to the founding states.

Regarding administration, the Turkish Cypriot side has been proposing a seven-member, four Greek Cypriot, three Turkish Cypriot, Swiss-type presidential council with a rotating president and which at the same time will be the council of ministers. The Greek Cypriot side insists on a presidential system with a president and a vice president from different "communities" elected for a five-year term and annual rotation on the basis of three years for Greek Cypriots, two years for Turkish Cypriots. President and vice president shall never be from the same community. There will be a nine-member council of ministers, composed of six Greek and three Turkish members.

There is no agreement on either the model or how the administration will be elected.

There appears to be an agreement between the sides that the foreign minister and interior minister should never come from the same constituent state. They as well apparently are in accord that the foreign minister and minister in charge of EU affairs should not come from the same founding state.

Though the two sides do not yet have full accord, they have achieved substantial understanding as regards the crisis resolution mechanism, high courts, which unlike the 1960 system should not have foreign representation.

As regards federal legislation, there is agreement between the two sides that the new federation will have a bicameral system; a senate and a house of representatives. While the upper house or senate will be composed of equal number of Greek and Turkish Cypriot senators, representing the political equality of the two constituent states, the lower house or house of representatives will be composed of representatives allocation according to the proportions of the populations of the two constituent states. The apparent disagreement here seems to be the ratio. While Turkish Cypriots demand that under any circumstances the number of Turkish Cypriot representatives should not be less than one-third of the overall seats, Greek Cypriots say Turkish Cypriot representation should not be less than one-quarter. This appears to be a breach-able disagreement. However, the sides have no agreement on the procedures of legislation with Greek Cypriots defending that simple majority must be enough as the lower house represents proportionate populations of constituent states, Turkish Cypriots demand a fixed ratio of two- fifths or one-quarter approval by Turkish Cypriot members to adopt a legislation.

The sides do not have as well full agreement how the elections will be held.

Regarding autonomous bodies such as the the office of the chief prosecutor, ombudsman, court of accounts, the central bank and the banking watchdog body the sides have almost full agreement that heads and deputies of these bodies should not come from the same constituent state. However, when it comes to the tenure and powers of these autonomous bodies the sides have minor differences. Now, may I ask, in view of what we wrote over the past two days, is there progress in the Cyprus talks?

Just before Turkey and the rest of the Muslim world started celebrating the holy sacrifice holiday, Greek Cypriot Leader Demetrios Christofias and Turkish Cypriot Prime Minister Ferdi Sabit Soyer came together on the island with some 1,500 guests from the two peoples of the eastern Mediterranean island for an annual event organized by the Greek Cypriot senior coalition partner, the Labor People’s Progressive Party, or AKEL, and the Turkish Cypriot senior coalition partner, the Republican Turks’ Party, or the CTP.

The meeting was a routine, annual event of the Famagusta branches of the two socialist parties. What was not routine? Firstly, Christofias was no longer just the secretary-general of AKEL, but he was also the Greek Cypriot leader. Secondly, for the first time in the political history of the island, a Greek Cypriot leader complained about the behavior or negotiating position of a Turkish Cypriot leader not only to the Turkish Cypriot people but also to the representatives of a political party who was the former party of the Turkish Cypriot leader in office.

Christofias started his speech stressing that he was attending the meeting, "to tell you the realities," that is not to wine and dine only, and head on accused Mehmet Ali Talat, his Turkish Cypriot counterpart and negotiating partner for the past three months in what has been described as the "comprehensive talks," of behaving in a manner very much like Rauf Denktaş, the hard liner former Turkish Cypriot leader, and of trying to promote confederation or a two-state settlement rather than talking about creation of a unitary federal state.

He stressed that the past three months of Cyprus talks did not meet his expectations and though the negotiation process was still at a beginning stage and it was too early to reach a definitive conclusion, he was unhappy with the way the talks were progressing.

Why is Christofias unhappy? Perhaps Christofias was assuming that Talat would continue abiding with the "Cyprus belongs to Cypriots" slogan the AKEL and CTP shared when both were in the opposition, and the understanding of the two socialist parties, again during those years, that a settlement must be reached by "kicking out from the island the Turkish military" and by rehashing the concept of "Cyprus nation" - which would render Turkish Cypriots nothing further than the Maronite, Armenian or Latin minorities in the predominantly Greek Cypriot "nation" on the island.

Ever since I was bitterly beaten up by four policemen on a May 1980 morning in front of, what was then, the Iş Bank headquarters across from the then headquarters of the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation, or TRT, and had to spend three days in a hospital, I have developed an allergy to the policeÉ That is, I must admit that I am quite biased against the police...

Being broke was nothing extraordinary for us students at those times, though I was much better off compared to many of my friends because I had a part time job with the Turkish Daily News and was getting a salary. My courses were in the morning hours and most of the time I walked from the Sıhhiye building of the Faculty of Letters to the then headquarters of the TDN on Tunus Avenue every noon.

That day there was a demonstration of students in front of the Interior Ministry and the police were applying all methods of persuasion (!) to disperse the students. I was not among the demonstrators. Indeed, I was walking on the other side of the boulevard. I was in front of the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges, or TOBB, when I first noticed that some policemen were approaching me.

For more than 500 meters I managed to walk faster than them, but just at the corner of the Is Bank I all of a sudden felt a strong pain in the back of my right knee. I collapsed and fell on the pavement; the books under my arm were spread all around. For about half an hour the four policemen, who had chased me up to that point, entertained themselves by ruthlessly landing their truncheons into almost every section of my body.

When they were tired with beating me, they left and instead of going to the newspaper I took a taxi home. Apparently I fainted in the bathroomÉ Then I woke up in hospital. Thank God that I was sharing flat with some friends and they were kind enough to take me to a hospital. I have never forgotten the trauma I lived and have never forgiven the police for what they did to me... And, of course I was no exception...

Since then, because of my profession I have made many "friends" among senior police officers, but still I prefer to stay away from the police as much as possible... I have written a lot about the problems of police officers; the need to increase their living standards; and of course the need to provide better education facilities to police and of giving importance to the education of police officers.

As the ruling Justice and Development Party, or AKP, must have understood with the closure case against it from which "for conjectural reasons" it escaped closure with a narrow, thin margin, sticking to the European Union process of Turkey and re-energizing its reform drive is an existential issue for itself as much as it is in the best interest of the country. This is a reality that the AKP must have understood, but somehow the ruling party and the prime minister while on the one hand keep on stressing their strong commitment to Turkey’s European Union membership bid, on the other hand are continuing to behave in a manner that creates doubts among E.U. leaders as well as E.U. diplomats accredited to Ankara to wonder whether they were deceived by the AKP all along and the ruling party perhaps never aimed at European Union membership.

Though some tend to attribute to the disappointment lived by the AKP government in the famous Leyla Şahin case at the European Court of Human Rights that concluded on Nov. 10, 2005 with a decision upholding a ban on wearing the Islamic headscarf at Turkish universities as the turning point in the reform drive of the AKP, still there is difficulty in understanding why the AKP has become so callous on the need to continue reforms or why it indeed stopped its outstanding reform performance in its first three years in Turkey’s administration.

Some agree as well that Cyprus was a complicating factor and the inability of the AKP to ease the international isolation of northern Cyprus was handicapping Ankara’s ability to deliver its pledges - such as opening up Turkish ports and airports to the Greek Cypriots - yet they continue questioning whether Turkey could indeed build a new and promising climate in its relations with the European Union should it "walked the extra mile" and maintained even more firmly its commitment to a pro-settlement approach on Cyprus and live up to its pledge of "being a step ahead" of the Greek side in peacemaking, while at the same time continued reforms enhancing individual freedoms and minority rights. Still, more people have started to ask nowadays, "Does the AKP gave up carrying Turkey to full membership? Is it satisfied with making Turkey a country in accession talks? Does not the AKP have a vision of Turkey in the European Union?"

Indeed, while up until recently to the dislike of opposition parties and groups in Turkey - who were all complaining that the "defeatist" approach of the AKP in fulfilling E.U. demands could hurt Turkey’s secular governance as well as national and territorial integrity - by and large the AKP was enjoying great sympathy and support from both European Commission executives and E.U. governments.

Now, more and more, not only European media are accusing the AKP of losing its reform spirit and gradually becoming no different than the past Turkish parties liquidated to a great extend by the Turkish nation, but it as well has become an actor contributing to a dangerous polarization in the Turkish society which in return was crippling the AKP’s reform capability.

AKP losing supporters in EU
Particularly, as is seen in some latest remarks to the media, the rather ultra-nationalistic jargon the prime minister has started to use in the local election campaign, as well as his very apparent "majority obsession" in pressing legislation through Parliament as well as in dealing with the opposition parties is causing frustration with the AKP even among those senior E.U. figures and Commission members who have been sympathetic toward Turkey and who have been rather critical of the failure of the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party, or DTP, to alienate itself from the separatist Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, gang.

Up until the 2007 elections and the conclusion of the closure case against it the AKP was defending the let-up in its reform drive with the pretext that it was compelled to concentrate on those "existential matters." Now, while the government for some time started to reassert its reform drive and commitment to the E.U. process in effect it still does nothing and on the contrary with ultra-nationalist and discriminative rhetoric aimed at winning some additional votes in the upcoming local elections, it is contributing to further widening of polarization which is crippling the pledge of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, "In spite of terrorism, will seek remedies within democracy," vow

The Supreme Military Council, or YAŞ, met throughout Tuesday and in the evening hours it was announced that: a) the regional situation was evaluated; b) the preparedness for war of the Turkish Armed Forces was examined and within that framework the requirements that have emerged and measures to be taken to meet those requirements were identified; c) within the domestic security overview, threats, risks and measures to be taken were discussed; d) and a total of 24 military personnel Ğ 19 of them because of drug addiction and of having immoral relations and five of them because of fundamentalist actions and behavior Ğ were sacked by a majority vote as their actions fell contrary to the fundamental structure of the Armed Forces and could upset military discipline.

That was what more or less the statement issued late Tuesday evening. How should it be interpreted? First of all, with the stress that the expulsion decision was adopted by a "majority vote" it has to be understood that there was no surprise and both Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Defense Minister Vecdi Gönül maintained their objection to the YAŞ expulsions and placed reservations. YAŞ decisions are final and cannot be appealed. Indeed, ever since the ruling Justice and Development Party, or AKP, came to power, the prime minister and the defense minister have been objecting to YAŞ expulsions on grounds that dismissals could not be appealed, while the military has been categorically objecting to government demands to grant appeal rights to those dismissed, saying such a move would upset discipline and the command chain in the military. As regards the "firsts" at the YAŞ meeting, the first one was of course the fact that this was the first YAŞ meeting of new top general İlker Başbuğ. The second very important and unprecedented aspect was in the sentence that 19 personnel were sacked because of drug addiction and of having developed immoral relations. This was the first-ever time that the military has sacked any of its personnel citing drug addiction as the reason.

And, of course the most important aspect of the meeting was the speedy approval by President Abdullah Gül of the YAŞ decisions, including the dismissals. When he was prime minister, Gül was the first-ever civilian member of the YAŞ to have placed a reservation on the dismissals. However, as he had no right to place a reservation and as president he could either endorse or turn down the YAŞ decisions and turning down would mean a fresh full-fledged crisis between the military and the civilian government Ğ including the president Ğ Gül did not have much choice but to approve the dismissals, in line with his declared position that as president his duty was to oversee the smooth functioning of the state and thus he would fulfill the duty entrusted to him as president.

Thus, a potential storm was avoided.

Manifested manipulation
It remains a mystery for most Turks how it happened that from the July 22, 2007, parliamentary elections till now, that is over the past 16 months, according to the Higher Election Board the Turkish, the population increased by some 6 million new adults eligible to vote in the March 2009 local polls. In the 2002 elections, however, although some 2.5 million new voters were added to the lists, the actual number of Turks eligible to cast a vote was nearly 43 million, some 1.5 million less than the previously disclosed figure. Why is there this incredible pendulum in the number of Turks eligible to vote? Was there a Rwanda-type genocidal massacre of some 4 million people in Turkey before the 2007 vote? Why was the decrease in the population? Or, how did it happen that within the past 16 months Turkish electoral population increased by 6 million?

What we indeed have is a manifested manipulation of population records. Before the 2007 vote the government was in efforts to prove its great economic successes that pushed the per capita income in the country close to the $10,000 mark. The lesser the population, then the higher the GNP, which would be better for the government. Now, we have a different situation. Municipalities receive assistance from the Treasury according to the number of people who reside in that municipality area. The higher the number of people living in that municipality, the higher will be the share of that municipality from allocations for local governance. That is, we are not a rabbit nation to multiply our population so speedily É It is just a matter of gross manipulation of records and statistics É Now, can we believe in statistics of any sort in this country?

For reasons unclear to Turkish industrialists, businessmen, economists, workers who were sacked from their jobs and anyone with some brains who could read and understand a bit about what’s going on, for a long time Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan kept on believing that the global financial crisis would past Turkey tangentially and with limited impact on the Turkish economy.

Since mid-August hundreds of thousands of Turkish workers lost their jobs; dozens of prominent factories of the country closed their doors; a sharp decrease in Turkish exports was recorded and Turkey’s credit rating was drastically degraded by international rating agencies, but up until very recently, Erdoğan was losing his temper, his eyes were growing bigger and he was starting to yell at and blame as "crisis mongers" whoever used the word "crisis" or talked about "the need to take some urgent economic measures."

Business people and industrialists demanding the government engage in a new standby deal with the IMF were being accused by the prime minister over the past many months of demanding state guarantee for their debts but he would not let "the IMF choke the Turkish economy É" Later, however, the prime minister, at least, agreed of the need of making a new deal with the IMF and met with the IMF executives in Washington. The deal is still in the making and how much credit the IMF will extend to Turkey is still unclear.

In the meantime the crisis was deepening and spreading across the country, the already incredible and unprecedented high current accounts deficit was skyrocketing and the country sinking in stagnation. Then, the crisis which was to past Turkey tangentially, learned from the prime minister over the last week that the crisis had not only reached Turkey, but had indeed reached a peak point and had started to subside but the "impacts of it will be felt for a long periodÉ"

Some may say, of course, that what we have been living through is one way of crisis management because had the government conceded that there was indeed a crisis in the country, because of the panic wave such an acknowledgment would have created in the society, the crisis would have grown even bigger É Some others, however, would say the Erdoğan government has tried to apply some sort of an ostrich approach, buried its head in sand and hoped that since it did not see the crisis, the crisis would past the country tangentially.