Serkan Demirtaş

Two things were more or less clear last week, before the NATO’s 60th anniversary summit. The first was that Turkey would strongly oppose to the candidacy of Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen -- in all conscience -- and the second was that Rasmussen would regardless become the next NATO chief during, or sometime after, the summit. The crisis had more than one dimensions to look into:

1. As a tradition, the NATO’s general-secretary is from Europe. But which Europe? Not of course Norway’s Jonas Gahr Stoere, since it’s a non-EU country. Not Bulgarian or Polish candidates, well, they are not from Central Europe. Only a central European figure that would serve in the interests of the French-German duo that wants to keep this post under their influence. Therefore, Turkey’s real conflict was against the EU and not NATO, institutionally.

2. At the same time, Rasmussen also gained Washington’s support thanks to his undisputable accordance with U.S policies, even those of the Bush administration. It would not be an easy thing for Turkey to veto a U.S-backed figure, just a day before Barack Obama’s visit to Turkey. This was one of the major indicators that an agreement would be reached at the summit.

3. Turkey was right in its opposition against Rasmussen for both his arrogant stance against the Muslim world during the cartoon crisis and his ignorance in hearing NATO-ally Ankara’s calls to shut Roj TV, a propaganda tool of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK. But it failed to disseminate its concerns to other countries and international media, which caused the perception that "Muslim Turkey against Danish PM who humiliated Muslims." Turkey, from the very beginning, had to make it clear that its objection was not to the personality of Rasmussen himself but rather was an institutional one.

4. Turkey was very late in clearly expressing itself on this matter. Instead of a clear and certain language, it preferred to use a vague rhetoric, giving the impression that "Ankara’s position was not finalized yet." It was the same position assumed for France’s return to NATO’s military wing. For weeks, no one could really be sure on Ankara’s position on the issue.

5. This vagueness went too far when the country’s president and prime minister were making contradictory remarks on the matter. President Abdullah Gül was signaling his approval of Rasmussen while only few hours after Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said he was very negative toward the Danish prime minister’s bid. Some optimists consider this as a "good cop-bad cop" routine, a move to strengthen the country’s hand. However, it just helped the image of Gül in the eyes of the Europeans again for his conciliatory move to balance Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

6. This crack between Gül and Erdoğan was also a show of disagreement between the government and the establishment, that is the military and the foreign ministry. The establishment was against of placing this issue on the religious grounds, and even was uncomfortable of Erdoğan’s preference to put the "cartoon crisis" well before the "Roj TV" problem when justifying the country’s concerns about Rasmussen.

7. According to some foreign diplomats, Turkey’s open opposition did significant damage to the image and credibility of Rasmussen. His tenure will not be an easy one compared to those of his predecessors. What Turkey did was legitimizing the entire Muslim countries’ concerns that could lead to unwillingness to cooperate with the alliance.

8. For Turkey, the agreed package that would satisfy its concerns is a very positive result, though it is a verbal one. Not only for the content but also for its guarantor, Barack Obama. Placing a Turkish aide on Rasmussen’s team, securing good command positions at NATO headquarters and getting the promise of a Turkish official to represent the NATO in Afghanistan for another term are important achievements.

9. But when it comes to stopping the broadcast of Roj TV, known as mouthpiece of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, its realization could take longer than it is thought, because the issue is rather a judicial one and is evaluated on the grounds of Denmark’s broad freedom of expressions principles. Having said this, it should be noted that Turkey has won another argument against Copenhagen in its struggle against Roj TV.

10. The first round of the crisis seems to be over. But Turkey’s stance against Rasmussen would likely to find its place in the annual Progress Report of the EU this fall. We hope to see that Olli Rehn will not take personal issue when penning the report.

The success in foreign policy also depends on the ability to mold public opinion inside and outside the country. And unfortunately, our governmen and foreign ministry have not passed the test so far. The NATO-related issues are good examples of that The 26-member NATO will hold its 60th anniversary summit on April 3-4 in Strasbourg, France, and Kehl, Germany. The summit will produce the Declaration on the Alliance Security, a key document for NATO to renew its Strategic Concept by 2011. Afghanistan, the enlargement of the alliance to the Adriatic, the French return to the military wing and the problem of nuclear proliferation are among the top issues to be discussed during the meeting.

Turkey, however, a long-time member of the top security club, would attend the summit not in a very comfortable mood. Before exploring why, let’s underline the NATO’s importance for Turkey: Since its entry to the alliance in 1952, NATO has been the keystone of Turkey’s defense and security policy, as well as its strongest bond with the United States and Western European countries. Turkey served as the defender of NATO’s southeastern flank, in a volatile region bordering the former Soviet Union during the Cold War.

In the post-Cold War era, Turkey did continue to provide security both in its region and elsewhere through active participation in NATO-led peace operations. Turkey’s contribution to the alliance has always found a warm welcome and praise from the allies and was rewarded in the choice of Istanbul as the venue of the 2004 NATO summit.

However, as many European diplomats put it, Turkey’s show of bad temper on some issues causes frustration and anger among some members. One of the main issues leading concerns is Turkey’s refusal to bargain in the context of NATO-EU relations. Turkey is accused of blocking the efforts to create a strong relationship between the two organizations, creating discomfort in both of them. "Turkey does not think that there is a problem. It neither brings its own proposals nor accepts ours. We are nearly at a dead end," a senior European official a while ago.

For Turkey, it’s a matter of principle and former assurances given by the alliance.

Turkish diplomats recall the deal made between NATO and the EU in 2002, called Berlin +, the arrangement whereby NATO offered to the EU the use of its assets and capabilities for EU-led operations. But it was NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer who complained about the deal in a speech last year.

"Berlin + has become too often a straitjacket rather than a facilitator. It is useful to have it as an important option, but we shouldn’t make it the only template for our relations. I would therefore like to see new, complementary options and possibilities whereby NATO and the EU can in principle have access to each other’s assets and capabilities, and which would allow us to plan in concert in those instances where Berlin + is clearly not the right framework. Let me be clear: both organizations would retain their independence and decision-making authority. That goes without saying."

Asking to renew the Berlin + deal is obviously a non-starter for Turkey, especially when its participation to the European Defense Agency is vetoed by the Greek Cypriots. But with the change of administration in Washington, which already announced its policy for "stronger and closer transatlantic ties," Turkey will likely face more pressure afterward.

The second problematic issue is the France’s return to NATO’s military wing. The French decision to resume its full place in NATO is warmly welcomed by almost all allies. In fact when Turkish diplomats positively evaluated France’s return, the prime minister and foreign minister gave the impression that they will first analyze the modalities of the move to decide whether approval from the Northern Alliance Council, the top decision-making body of the alliance, is needed. In earlier remarks Foreign Minister Ali Babacan did not rule out Turkey’s veto right, which would be legally justified but not politically correct. Turkey’s vague position in one of NATO’s most important decisions confused members of the alliance.

The third and one most current difficulty is the selection of the next secretary-general of NATO. Scheffer will leave office July 31, and Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen emerged as the firm favorite to take the post. Turkey’s objection to Rasmussen lies in Copenhagen’s unwillingness to stop Roj TV (known as the mouthpiece of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK) broadcasts in his country and an inability to handle the cartoon crisis. For all these reasons, it is likely that the next NATO chief will not be announced during the summit this week.

Having said all these, the answer to the question posed in the headline is no. Turkey is not a troublemaker in the alliance, and in fact it would be very unfair to say so. But it is also a fact that there is such a perception in many European countries.

Furthermore, the country’s top officials, with dramatically different statements on Rasmussen’s bid, somewhat created a perception of a two-headed state, not the best strategy in foreign policy-making.

In this age, foreign policy is conducted not only behind closed doors, through secret diplomacy. The success in foreign policy also depends on the ability to mold the public opinion inside and outside the country. And unfortunately, our government and foreign ministry has not passed the test so far.

“All told, there are now billions of people around the region and the world whose future depends upon decisions made in this very room over the next 25 years. Each has a stake in Turkey’s success in defining itself as a strong, secular, modern nation, proud of its traditions, fully part of Europe. That will require hard work and vision.”

This prophecy belongs to Bill Clinton, former United States president who addressed to Turkish Parliament during his visit to Turkey in 1999, almost ten years ago from another Democrat President Barack Obama’s trip to this country, as part of his first overseas tour since his election.

Since Obama’s visit to Turkey was declared by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton early March, there were numerous analyses and commentaries made on the new American leader’s decision to include this country to his itinerary. There will surely be a lot of them during and after the visit. Thus, before questioning why he comes to Turkey or what he will say in his statements or etc., it would be useful to take a look at to what extent the former president’s previsions were proven to be right. That is, did Turkish Parliament really shake the world with its decisions?

It was August 3, 2002 when the Turkish Parliament adopted a set of constitutional amendments that included the abolishment of the capital punishment; just months ago before the crucial European Union summit which historically decided to start accession talks with Turkey. Between 2002 and 2005, again this parliament voted in favor of more than nine constitutional amendment packages to make Turkey closer to the EU.

The commitment of Turkish lawmakers, with ups and downs, for the EU membership and the start of the negotiations in 2005 had positive affects on the entire Muslim world, which felt humiliated by the West at the post-9/11 era. Despite opposition within the organization, the European leaders have taken a courageous step in the direction of avoiding a potential “clash of civilization,” but of course thanks to Turkish Parliament’s dedication.

Another important decision of Turkish Parliament in which its effects went beyond national borders was on March 1, 2004 when it rejected a government motion allowing the U.S. to use the Turkish territory to be able to open an additional front for attacking against Saddam Hussein administration in Iraq.

Though the move had very negative impacts on Turkey’s ties with the U.S., it was praised by the rest of the world, which were against of the Iraqi war. 
Turkey’s decision to stay out of Iraqi war has also found scores of response from the Muslim world, as it was seen as a mark of more independent foreign policy.

On 28 August, 2007 the Turkish Parliament elected Abdullah Gül as the 11th president of Turkey, whose wife wears an Islamic headscarf, after months of tense debates on the grounds that it would be seen as a deviation from the secular orders of the republic. On 6 February, 2008 the Parliament voted in favor of annulment of the ban imposed on women wearing headscarf to study at the universities. That started another flurry of political struggle in the country, which caused top prosecutor to open a closure case against the ruling party arguing that the Justice and Development Party, or AKP, has become the focal point of anti-secular acts.