×
The anatomy of the crisis in NATO
Paylaş
LinkedinFlipboardLinki KopyalaYazı Tipi
Two things were more or less clear last week, before the NATO’s 60th anniversary summit. The first was that Turkey would strongly oppose to the candidacy of Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen -- in all conscience -- and the second was that Rasmussen would regardless become the next NATO chief during, or sometime after, the summit.
The crisis had more than one dimensions to look into:
1. As a tradition, the NATO’s general-secretary is from Europe. But which Europe? Not of course Norway’s Jonas Gahr Stoere, since it’s a non-EU country. Not Bulgarian or Polish candidates, well, they are not from Central Europe. Only a central European figure that would serve in the interests of the French-German duo that wants to keep this post under their influence. Therefore, Turkey’s real conflict was against the EU and not NATO, institutionally.
2. At the same time, Rasmussen also gained Washington’s support thanks to his undisputable accordance with U.S policies, even those of the Bush administration. It would not be an easy thing for Turkey to veto a U.S-backed figure, just a day before Barack Obama’s visit to Turkey. This was one of the major indicators that an agreement would be reached at the summit.
3. Turkey was right in its opposition against Rasmussen for both his arrogant stance against the Muslim world during the cartoon crisis and his ignorance in hearing NATO-ally Ankara’s calls to shut Roj TV, a propaganda tool of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK. But it failed to disseminate its concerns to other countries and international media, which caused the perception that "Muslim Turkey against Danish PM who humiliated Muslims." Turkey, from the very beginning, had to make it clear that its objection was not to the personality of Rasmussen himself but rather was an institutional one.
4. Turkey was very late in clearly expressing itself on this matter. Instead of a clear and certain language, it preferred to use a vague rhetoric, giving the impression that "Ankara’s position was not finalized yet." It was the same position assumed for France’s return to NATO’s military wing. For weeks, no one could really be sure on Ankara’s position on the issue.
5. This vagueness went too far when the country’s president and prime minister were making contradictory remarks on the matter. President Abdullah Gül was signaling his approval of Rasmussen while only few hours after Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said he was very negative toward the Danish prime minister’s bid. Some optimists consider this as a "good cop-bad cop" routine, a move to strengthen the country’s hand. However, it just helped the image of Gül in the eyes of the Europeans again for his conciliatory move to balance Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
6. This crack between Gül and Erdoğan was also a show of disagreement between the government and the establishment, that is the military and the foreign ministry. The establishment was against of placing this issue on the religious grounds, and even was uncomfortable of Erdoğan’s preference to put the "cartoon crisis" well before the "Roj TV" problem when justifying the country’s concerns about Rasmussen.
7. According to some foreign diplomats, Turkey’s open opposition did significant damage to the image and credibility of Rasmussen. His tenure will not be an easy one compared to those of his predecessors. What Turkey did was legitimizing the entire Muslim countries’ concerns that could lead to unwillingness to cooperate with the alliance.
8. For Turkey, the agreed package that would satisfy its concerns is a very positive result, though it is a verbal one. Not only for the content but also for its guarantor, Barack Obama. Placing a Turkish aide on Rasmussen’s team, securing good command positions at NATO headquarters and getting the promise of a Turkish official to represent the NATO in Afghanistan for another term are important achievements.
9. But when it comes to stopping the broadcast of Roj TV, known as mouthpiece of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, its realization could take longer than it is thought, because the issue is rather a judicial one and is evaluated on the grounds of Denmark’s broad freedom of expressions principles. Having said this, it should be noted that Turkey has won another argument against Copenhagen in its struggle against Roj TV.
10. The first round of the crisis seems to be over. But Turkey’s stance against Rasmussen would likely to find its place in the annual Progress Report of the EU this fall. We hope to see that Olli Rehn will not take personal issue when penning the report.
1. As a tradition, the NATO’s general-secretary is from Europe. But which Europe? Not of course Norway’s Jonas Gahr Stoere, since it’s a non-EU country. Not Bulgarian or Polish candidates, well, they are not from Central Europe. Only a central European figure that would serve in the interests of the French-German duo that wants to keep this post under their influence. Therefore, Turkey’s real conflict was against the EU and not NATO, institutionally.
2. At the same time, Rasmussen also gained Washington’s support thanks to his undisputable accordance with U.S policies, even those of the Bush administration. It would not be an easy thing for Turkey to veto a U.S-backed figure, just a day before Barack Obama’s visit to Turkey. This was one of the major indicators that an agreement would be reached at the summit.
3. Turkey was right in its opposition against Rasmussen for both his arrogant stance against the Muslim world during the cartoon crisis and his ignorance in hearing NATO-ally Ankara’s calls to shut Roj TV, a propaganda tool of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK. But it failed to disseminate its concerns to other countries and international media, which caused the perception that "Muslim Turkey against Danish PM who humiliated Muslims." Turkey, from the very beginning, had to make it clear that its objection was not to the personality of Rasmussen himself but rather was an institutional one.
4. Turkey was very late in clearly expressing itself on this matter. Instead of a clear and certain language, it preferred to use a vague rhetoric, giving the impression that "Ankara’s position was not finalized yet." It was the same position assumed for France’s return to NATO’s military wing. For weeks, no one could really be sure on Ankara’s position on the issue.
5. This vagueness went too far when the country’s president and prime minister were making contradictory remarks on the matter. President Abdullah Gül was signaling his approval of Rasmussen while only few hours after Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said he was very negative toward the Danish prime minister’s bid. Some optimists consider this as a "good cop-bad cop" routine, a move to strengthen the country’s hand. However, it just helped the image of Gül in the eyes of the Europeans again for his conciliatory move to balance Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
6. This crack between Gül and Erdoğan was also a show of disagreement between the government and the establishment, that is the military and the foreign ministry. The establishment was against of placing this issue on the religious grounds, and even was uncomfortable of Erdoğan’s preference to put the "cartoon crisis" well before the "Roj TV" problem when justifying the country’s concerns about Rasmussen.
7. According to some foreign diplomats, Turkey’s open opposition did significant damage to the image and credibility of Rasmussen. His tenure will not be an easy one compared to those of his predecessors. What Turkey did was legitimizing the entire Muslim countries’ concerns that could lead to unwillingness to cooperate with the alliance.
8. For Turkey, the agreed package that would satisfy its concerns is a very positive result, though it is a verbal one. Not only for the content but also for its guarantor, Barack Obama. Placing a Turkish aide on Rasmussen’s team, securing good command positions at NATO headquarters and getting the promise of a Turkish official to represent the NATO in Afghanistan for another term are important achievements.
9. But when it comes to stopping the broadcast of Roj TV, known as mouthpiece of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, its realization could take longer than it is thought, because the issue is rather a judicial one and is evaluated on the grounds of Denmark’s broad freedom of expressions principles. Having said this, it should be noted that Turkey has won another argument against Copenhagen in its struggle against Roj TV.
10. The first round of the crisis seems to be over. But Turkey’s stance against Rasmussen would likely to find its place in the annual Progress Report of the EU this fall. We hope to see that Olli Rehn will not take personal issue when penning the report.
Paylaş
LinkedinFlipboardLinki KopyalaYazı Tipi
