Trying to decipher PM Erdoğan

What makes it even more intriguing is that he is utilizing this strong language as the prime minister of a country that has to conduct its foreign policy in a "minefield" given the crises that surround it. This is a fact of life that has always dictated caution to Ankara in its foreign policy statements.

So what is driving him?

This is what Svante E. Cornell, the director of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program; a joint center affiliated with Johns Hopkins University had to say in a recent article in the Jerusalem Post on January 14:

"Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan's words Ğ that Israel's actions will be punished by God and help lead it to self-destruction Ğ are too significant to be taken lightly. (In fact he did not say it that way, but uttered words interpreted in this way by the Israeli media. S.I.) Indeed, they are part of the trend of a Turkish government guided more by Islamic solidarity and anti-Western sentiment than by pragmatic calculations of interest. Indeed, Turkey's international behavior suggests that its attachment to the West is tenuous at best Ğ and eroding."

Sedat Ergin, the Editor in Chief of Milliyet, for his part, reminded us, in a long opinion piece, that Prime Minister Erdoğan was until the year 2000 very firmly attached to the Islamist leader and former prime minister Necmettin Erbakan, whose "Milli Görüş" or "National view" ideology was based on being anti-Western in general and anti-Israel in particular.

While moderating this approach after his party was elected in 2002, and even driving Turkey closer to the EU Ğ a fact that enabled him to be attributed with "leadership qualities" by the international community Ğ his anti-Israeli and pro-Hamas stance is now leading many to believe that Erdoğan’s "Milli Görüş" past is never far from the surface.

Mr. Erdoğan himself points out that his anger over Israel’s Gaza operating stems from the fact that he is also a father and therefore can not stand to see innocent children being killed. This of course is a natural human reaction and Israel is being almost universally condemned over this.

But those who criticize Erdoğan have been quick to point out that "humane concerns" are indivisible, meaning that you can not feel outraged in one incident and remain selectively silent on another.

What is meant here is that Prime Minister Erdoğan has not only displayed scant humane concern over the children that have lost and are still loosing their lives in Darfur, but has even hosted the alleged perpetrator of these crimes, the leader of Sudan, in Turkey twice.

This attitude has left many asking cynically is if Erdoğan’s concern over the Palestinians in Gaza is because of the close affinity he feels with the Islamist Hamas Ğ even if it is on international lists of terrorist organization Ğ while he conveniently chooses to overlook the accusations against Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir because he is an Islamist.

If this is true, and there is circumstantial evidence to convince some that it is, then it puts him, and consequently Turkey, seeing as he is the PM, on the side of the radical camp in the region. This brings us to another related issue.

There is commentary appearing in the European media that Turkey’s regional role has increased and that Ankara’s closeness to Hamas is an advantage in this respect.

No doubt there is such an advantage but the matter has to be put in perspective because AKP sources are utilizing such commentary to justify Erdogan’s angry outbursts against Israel.

The bottom line here is the increasing influence Ankara clearly has over Hamas. The most important advantage that accrues from this is that Turkey is in a position to pressure Hamas to accept terms that will ease the general situation. These include, primarily, repudiating terrorism and accepting the right of Israel to exist.

Turkey’s role will not, however, be one of trying to get Israel or the international community to accept Hamas terms. Ankara is not in a position to play the role of intermediary in this respect given that it has made its pro-Hamas stance apparent. Put bluntly, Turkey’s role in all this is to basically "tame Hamas" and to bring it to a line.

This is undeniably an advantage for those concerned with the Middle East, and no one at this stage would want Turkey to stop playing this role.

But there is the diplomatic cost on the other side of the coin in terms of the concern that Erdoğan’s pro-Hamas stance has caused among some key Arab administrations in the region that are wary of fundamentalist movements.

This is the point at which President Abdullah Gül and Foreign Minister Ali Babacan came into the picture recently. Palestinian President Abbas called Gül last week to try and understand what was going on in Ankara. He could not, after all, have been too pleased about Erdogan’s remarks to the effect that Hamas was not elected back in 2006 to please him.

A bottom line in the written statement on behalf of Gül after his phone conversation with his Palestinian counterpart was that Turkey acknowledges the authority of Abbas, and expects Palestinians to unite under him and work for a solution to the Middle East problem, to which Ankara is willing to make all the necessary contribution.

Then came Foreign Minister Babacan’s remarks to prominent journalists, on his way to Brussels for a meeting on the Gaza crisis, in which he indicated clearly that Hamas has to decide whether it will be the gun, or politics.

Gül's, and Babacan’s remarks were, of course, relieving for those who have increasing doubts about Turkey’s direction. These remarks were also judged within the context of Erdogan’s remarks and generally considered as being an attempt at trying to bring Turkey back inline as far as its general Middle East policy is concerned.

If so this points to radically different approaches between the Prime Minister and his own foreign minister, let alone the President. This leaves us with the following three options in trying to understand Erdogan, to come back to the main question asked above. These are as follows:

1- Not withstanding his position on Darfur, Erdoğan feels genuine and humane sympathy for Palestinian suffering in Gaza which has hit our TV screens on a nightly basis.

2-Erdoğan’s "Milli Görüş" background has come to the surface once again here and his attitude basically reflects Islamic solidarity and shows that he has not changed in this respect when push comes to shove.

3-Erdoğan is playing to the domestic gallery, prior to the upcoming local elections, given that the Turkish public is incensed at Israel over Gaza and is therefore generally happy with his angry remarks aimed at this country.

It’s really up to those who have been following these events to decide which option they like in trying to decipher Prime Minister Erdoğan.