An unforgettable year for the military

In order for me to talk about my observation, I first need to remind you of the public’s former perception in respect to the Turkish Armed Forces, or TSK. For the majority of Turkish Society, especially for the secular, educated middle and upper class, the TSK was a guarantee of the system.

It was considered the keeper of secularism. Within this frame it was perceived as the impartial censor of administrations. An institution purified of fraud, serious, disciplined, well-educated and only concerned for its motherland, and if need be "asked to defend the regime or motherland in the name of its people."

The Turkish society for years used to see its soldiers as their cure-all supermen. People would take their complaints about administrations contradicting the system to the military, and generals would take it as their duty to interfere to administrations upon the request of the people. And they would be applauded for this. The TSK would fondly fulfill their duty. Whenever the TSK would interfere, it would not do so for more than 1 or 2 years showing that their intention was not to use this for self interest. This situation gave them an immense power. People would trust the military more than the individuals it elected. The military would use its position very well. If need be it would through a declaration or a statement administrations take a step back, change their decision or even resign from their duty.

Then, with the Justice and Development Party, or AKP, taking over the government in 2002, this balance slowly started to change.

And in 2008 a new balance was established.

From journals published in the magazine Nokta we learned that in 2004 commanders-in-chief engaged in preparations for a military coup in order to stop the AKP, but did not receive the expected support from the period’s General Staff Gen. Özkök and thus could not deepen their plan further. Despite Gen. Özkök received great reactions from the secular portion of society, it became obvious over time that he prevented action against the AKP. But with the appointment of Gen. Büyükanıt to the office of the General Staff, TSK’s attitude changed. Especially when the AKP wanted to position Abdullah Gül with his wife, who wears a headscarf, in Çankaya, the secular portion went crazy. Fear of losing the system spread and people started to appeal to the TSK. In the period of 2006 to 2007 Gen. Büyükanıt behaved the way secularists wanted him to. In secular matters as well as in northern Iraq matters, a constant dispute, even a quarrel had started.

The General Staff criticized the administration whenever possible... the military did not invite wives with a headscarf to receptions... the military took on an obvious attitude during Republic meetings organized by secular groups and in spectacles marching toward AnıtkabirÉ finally the biggest misfortune happened on the night of April 27, 2007, when the TSK posted an announcement on its Web site which was written in a more brisk manner than an internal memorandum. According to some this was an ultimatum. The AKP was the target and briskly accused before elections on July 22. The TSK played its conservative role and wanted the administration to change. Only this time things developed in an unusual way.

The administration responded to the announcement in the same brisk manner. On July 22, the AKP increased its votes from 37 to 47 percent, got the message across to the TSK, "We don’t share the same view with you."

Old balances were disturbed.

The TSK, despite its announcement on April 22, could not say a word. In 2008 this new balance was clinched. Gül became president. Republican meetings subsided. On May 5, after Erdoğan met with Gen. Büyükanıt "privately for three hours," all of a sudden old disputes between the TSK and the administration subsided completely. The new General Staff Gen. Başbuğ changed old attitudes completely. A TSK emerged that is true to basic principles, but not in dispute with the administration, a TSK that does its job well, does not talk as long as there is no need, a TSK that attaches priority to fight the PKK terror and tries to protect the society’s safety. In summary, 2008 was a year that made it clear that there has been an end to the period in which the Turkish Armed Forces used to interfere in political administrations.

Feeling the need to explain themselves
The first most obvious side of Gen. Başbuğ during the first period of his position was to repair broken hearts and brisk reactions that were experienced during the period of the AKP administration and to establish communication with all parts of the country. TSK’s struggle with the PKK increased this communication need. We all know the result of 2008: PKK: 670 dead. 224 wounded and surrendered. Military: 109 martyrs, 94 wounded.Civilians: 24 dead, 50 wounded. Compared to results in the past, one can call it a successful year for the TSK. But what really left its mark on 2008 was, that, based on an information sharing agreement with Washington, thousands of soldiers went a PKK hunt, called Güneş Operasyonu (Sun Operation), in snowy mountains in the border region, which started on Feb. 21 and lasted 8 days, for one full year unmanned aircrafts observed and bombarding took place. The "Güneş Operasyonu" struck PKK’s preparations unexpectedly. This operation, which taken on in snow and with big risks disturbed the terror organization’s spring-summer attempts on a large scale.

For the first time, the TSK hit the PKK in its own cove. Unmanned aircraft were a novelty of 2008. In Gen. Büyükanıt’s words, thanks to these aircraft, "PKK operations turned into a ’Big Brother’ game," that made it difficult for the PKK to pass cross border from northern Iraq into Turkey, but did not cease it completely. However, with Washington providing information to Ankara helped limiting PKK’s activities in northern Iraq and posed a turning point in this regard. In 2008 two unfortunate events were experienced that made the TSK upset and caused question marks to rise in the mind of the public. The first event took place on Sept. 21, 2007, when eight soldiers were taken hostage by the PKK in Dağlıca during an incursion and released after several days. The other event took place on May 10, 2008, when 19 PKK members were killed, 17 of our soldiers were martyred and 21 of our soldiers wounded during an incursion in Aktütün-Bayraktepe. These two events created reaction in the public. They spread the impression that the TSK is not as successful as set forth and that neglect took place. A never-seen-before criticism campaign was then seen. This time it wasn’t the pious, but also the secular media throwing arrows.

The TSK, for the first time, after these events, felt like it had to explain how the struggle with terror is done, how much devotion and patience were necessary and how the TSK runs this struggle. Formerly one used to say "Say hi to the army and carry on with your path." Now the army is called to account. The Chief of General Staff himself has told the cabinet, including the prime minister, "Here is what we did," and organized consecutive briefings with the media. Weekly press briefings started. The TSK for the first time felt like explaining itself and its work and processes. It was understood from the communication that the job of commanders was not sermonizing at ceremonies or talk in purple prose regarding motherland and people, but to inform its people. For the TSK, 2008 was looking from this perspective like an unforgettable year.