"Do you really expect Egemen Bağış to make a difference to Turkish Ğ EU relations?" a Turkish diplomat working in one of the embassies in Europe asked me. In this question and answer session the traffic should have been going the opposite direction. But this alone shows the frustration on the part of the Turkish bureaucracy dealing with EU affairs.
The answer could be either pessimistic or optimistic depending on the way you look at the subject. If one has to take the performance of Ali Babacan, who tried to carry both the hats of foreign minister and chief negotiator, as a reference point, then there is reason to be optimistic. Let aside personalities and personal performances, the government was told time and again that it was a huge mistake to put both responsibilities on the shoulders of one person. In this respect an important mistake has been corrected although belatedly. Well, better late than never.
No doubt Bağış will give his all to this "very visible" job to use the opportunity to the widest extent to advance his political career. But can he get a result. If one looks to the issue from this aspect, then there is reason to be pessimistic. Bağış took over the job at a time when the Turkish Ğ EU relations plunged to their lowest point.
Global economic meltdown has now been added to the institutional crisis within the EU, which certainly will make it even more difficult to push the case for Turkish membership. Elections for the European Parliament in June to be followed by elections in Germany in autumn will not provide the best opportunities to advance Turkey’s case either. To the contrary, anti Turkish slogans will be part of some circle’s electoral campaigns.
It will not be possible to start negotiations in new chapters this year. Ankara has so far opened talks in 10 of the 35 policy areas. Talks on a dozen policy areas are frozen due the trade row with the Greek Cypriot administration and French veto. Starting talks on the remaining chapters will prove difficult due to not political but this time technical difficulties related to Turkey’s preparedness.
The second half of 2009 is the official deadline to solve the trade row with Greek Cypriots. The EU will review the accession process if Turkey does not change its decision to keep its ports closed to Greek Cypriot use under a custom union pact with the EU.
For now, no one expects the leaders of the two communities on the island to reach a solution by the second half of the year. Similarly no one expects the Turkish government to make a unilateral move and open its ports to Greek shipping in the absence of a solution.
In this case Turkey does not have the luxury of saying, "I will deliver neither on the reforms nor on the Cyprus issue." It is a known fact that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is categorically opposed to making any unilateral move on the Cyprus issue. This leaves behind the reforms.
In this respect Bağış can play an important role. But his job will be quite difficult. It is known that Prime Minister Erdoğan is against a speedy reform process. He is so frustrated by the negative attitude of some European capitals to Turkish bid for membership that, he does not want any pressure exerted on state institutions for the adoption of the acquis communautaire, the EU’s body of law. He has objected to the time table set in the national program prepared by the EU National Secretariat.
This is the critical point where Bağış, a close advisor to the prime minister can make a difference. Babacan, who is known to be closer to President Abdullah Gül than Erdoğan had neither the time, energy nor the willingness to convince the prime minister. And even if he had the willingness, he lacked the necessary influence over the prime minister. Egemen, who has a better access to the prime minister, can do a better job to convince him on the necessity of reviving the reform process. No one is expecting Bağış to take the EU car to full speed when he gets on the wheel. At this stage, we will be content if he keeps the car in second gear and avoids slipping into neutral..