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The fall agenda
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The European Union has started sending some strong messages to Ankara that the fall evaluation report may contain unpleasant sentences and that Turkey has limited time to take "concrete reform steps" to improve the situation.
Despite the not-so-promising stance of some EU countries headed by Angela Merkel from Germany and Nicolas Sarkozy from France, Turkey has Italy, Britain, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Finland, the Czech Republic, Poland and many other "friends" in the EU who will not endorse such a drastic development.
The Greek Cypriot leadership was initially talking about using its veto power against Turkey should Ankara not comply with its 2006 pledge of opening its ports and airports to southern Cyprus Ğ a move that would mean recognition of the Greek Cypriot state by Ankara as the "sole legitimate government" on the eastern Mediterranean island, thus abandoning the Turkish Cypriot state and people. Now, the Demetris Christofias administration is stressing that it would not use its veto power but that it expects its EU allies to use their leverage on Ankara to comply with its obligations.
The Cyprus condition attached to the EU process of Turkey, unfortunately, is a direct product of the hypocritical political mentality of the ruling Justice and Development Party, or AKP, government. Though the government was aware that it cannot live up to such a pledge, for the sake of getting a negotiation date and later for securing the actual start of accession talks, it pledged the EU that it would sign and put into force an additional protocol to the 1964 Association Agreement and thus enhance the scope of the customs union deal to cover all new members of the EU, including the Greek Cypriots. It is not an excuse now to claim that since the EU did not lift the isolation of Turkish Cypriots in contravention to its 2004 pledges or its failure to put into force the April 29, 2004 Green Line, financial assistance and direct trade regulations, Turkey would not agree to open its ports and airports to the Greek Cypriots. Though I very much appreciate that Turkish ports are not opened to Greek Cypriots, it is obvious that the AKP government has deceived the EU.
Furthermore, the negotiations framework document that Turkey has accepted underlines the need for Turkey to "normalize" relations with all EU countries. Since Turkey does not have "normal relations" with only the Greek-Cypriot run Cyprus Republic, and no other EU country, the obligation Turkey has undertaken by accepting the negotiations framework is obvious. Can Turkey undertake such a move by the end of this summer before the EU bureaucrats complete writing the evaluation paper on Turkey?
Can Turkey open Halki seminary?
Reports from Brussels indicate that the EU might be willing to "postpone" a possible hurdle over Cyprus, but at a price. The EU is telling Ankara, rather wisely, that the Turkey-EU process cannot be simplified to only the Cyprus problem and issues related to Cyprus, but indeed the backbone of the process must be Turkey’s progress toward acquiring EU norms and values in democracy, living standards, economy and all other fields, including minority rights. For example, Enlargement Commissioner Ollie Rehn has reportedly, and very rightly, implied at a meeting with a group of Turkish journalists that if Turkey undertakes some concrete reform moves, for example agreeing to the reopening of the Greek Orthodox Halki Seminary, the country’s "failure" in "abiding with its obligations" regarding Cyprus might not be focused on as heavily by the EU Council this year. But, will the conservative establishment, including the military, agree to reopening Halki?
Can Turkey avoid a possible nightmare in its EU bid by undertaking some serious reforms over the next few months? Very unlikely, particularly in view of the fact that after July, Parliament will be on summer recess for two months.
Can the Cyprus talks progress fast enough to avert a collision in Turkey’s EU process by this fall? So far the talks are not progressing well, yet expectations are increasing that the "give-and-take" phase of the talks that are expected to start toward the end of July may produce a new peace plan, perhaps shorter than the failed 2004 blueprint.
Can the UN Security Council take some drastic action regarding the UN force in Cyprus in December and force Greek Cypriots to a compromise power sharing deal? It appears to be in the cards, but will the Russians and the French agree to it?
It will definitely be an exciting fall.
The Greek Cypriot leadership was initially talking about using its veto power against Turkey should Ankara not comply with its 2006 pledge of opening its ports and airports to southern Cyprus Ğ a move that would mean recognition of the Greek Cypriot state by Ankara as the "sole legitimate government" on the eastern Mediterranean island, thus abandoning the Turkish Cypriot state and people. Now, the Demetris Christofias administration is stressing that it would not use its veto power but that it expects its EU allies to use their leverage on Ankara to comply with its obligations.
The Cyprus condition attached to the EU process of Turkey, unfortunately, is a direct product of the hypocritical political mentality of the ruling Justice and Development Party, or AKP, government. Though the government was aware that it cannot live up to such a pledge, for the sake of getting a negotiation date and later for securing the actual start of accession talks, it pledged the EU that it would sign and put into force an additional protocol to the 1964 Association Agreement and thus enhance the scope of the customs union deal to cover all new members of the EU, including the Greek Cypriots. It is not an excuse now to claim that since the EU did not lift the isolation of Turkish Cypriots in contravention to its 2004 pledges or its failure to put into force the April 29, 2004 Green Line, financial assistance and direct trade regulations, Turkey would not agree to open its ports and airports to the Greek Cypriots. Though I very much appreciate that Turkish ports are not opened to Greek Cypriots, it is obvious that the AKP government has deceived the EU.
Furthermore, the negotiations framework document that Turkey has accepted underlines the need for Turkey to "normalize" relations with all EU countries. Since Turkey does not have "normal relations" with only the Greek-Cypriot run Cyprus Republic, and no other EU country, the obligation Turkey has undertaken by accepting the negotiations framework is obvious. Can Turkey undertake such a move by the end of this summer before the EU bureaucrats complete writing the evaluation paper on Turkey?
Can Turkey open Halki seminary?
Reports from Brussels indicate that the EU might be willing to "postpone" a possible hurdle over Cyprus, but at a price. The EU is telling Ankara, rather wisely, that the Turkey-EU process cannot be simplified to only the Cyprus problem and issues related to Cyprus, but indeed the backbone of the process must be Turkey’s progress toward acquiring EU norms and values in democracy, living standards, economy and all other fields, including minority rights. For example, Enlargement Commissioner Ollie Rehn has reportedly, and very rightly, implied at a meeting with a group of Turkish journalists that if Turkey undertakes some concrete reform moves, for example agreeing to the reopening of the Greek Orthodox Halki Seminary, the country’s "failure" in "abiding with its obligations" regarding Cyprus might not be focused on as heavily by the EU Council this year. But, will the conservative establishment, including the military, agree to reopening Halki?
Can Turkey avoid a possible nightmare in its EU bid by undertaking some serious reforms over the next few months? Very unlikely, particularly in view of the fact that after July, Parliament will be on summer recess for two months.
Can the Cyprus talks progress fast enough to avert a collision in Turkey’s EU process by this fall? So far the talks are not progressing well, yet expectations are increasing that the "give-and-take" phase of the talks that are expected to start toward the end of July may produce a new peace plan, perhaps shorter than the failed 2004 blueprint.
Can the UN Security Council take some drastic action regarding the UN force in Cyprus in December and force Greek Cypriots to a compromise power sharing deal? It appears to be in the cards, but will the Russians and the French agree to it?
It will definitely be an exciting fall.
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