Gül in Baghdad

The visit comes after reports that Talabani and the United States government have been working behind the scenes with Ankara to convince PKK members to lay down their arms in exchange for some sort of an amnesty. Up until now, even the mention of the word "amnesty" had provoked strongly negative reactions in a Turkish society traumatized by PKK-related violence, which has claimed the lives of more than 40,000 people since August 1984.

In recent remarks to the Turkish media, Talabani revealed that the PKK will be asked to give up "armed struggle" at an April conference of regional Kurds that will convene in the Iraqi city of Arbil. But he said that Turkey must also be prepared to accommodate itself to the reality that many separatists would not give up their arms. Members of the gang who were not directly involved with violence must be provided an opportunity to freely return to their families and resume a civilian life, Talabani suggested. The idea that PKK leaders could be resettled in a northern European country as been floated as well.

An arrangement for the "liquidation" of the PKK may not seem feasible to many Turkish terrorism experts, but it appears to be a must for the security of the Iraqi Kurdish region after the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq. Though it may sound paradoxical, after the U.S. withdrawal, only Turkey can offer security to Iraqi Kurds who might face serious challenge from both Sunni and Shiite Arab groups in Iraq. An impediment, indeed the most important one, for the progress of good relations between Ankara and the Iraqi Kurdish administration in northern Iraq has been the presence of PKK elements in that region. Thus, in order to get Turkish backing, Iraqi Kurds must cooperate with Ankara against the PKK presence in their territory. While skeptics of the idea say that Kurds should not be expected to harm Kurds, history shows that Ankara has been the most-trustworthy protector of the Iraqi Kurds at difficult times. After the first Gulf War, for example, Turkey not only turned down requests by Saddam Hussein’s regime to join its war on the Kurds, it provided a safe haven along its border for hundreds of thousands of Iraqi Kurds when they were pursued by Hussein’s troops.

Kurds need Turkey & Turkey needs Kurds

In today’s Iraq, the Kurds enjoy unprecedented political clout because of their strong cooperation with the American presence in the country. But that same thing has been condemned by pro-independence Sunni and Shiite Arab elements as "collaboration with the enemy," making Kurds the target of hatred. After the withdrawal of American troops, can the central administration in Baghdad provide adequate security for the Iraqi Kurdish region? What can prevent Iraq from slipping into a civil war in which Iraqi Kurds and their oil-rich region will be the common target of the country’s Shiite and Sunni Arabs? It is obvious that in the period now emerging, Iraqi Kurds need Turkey far more than Turkey needs them.

Indeed, Talabani, also the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, has been acting very responsibly and statesmanlike in handling the problem at hand and has been actively working behind the scenes to achieve a historic peace between Ankara and the separatist Kurdish group as well as between Ankara, the central administration in Iraq, northern Iraqi Kurds and the United States.

But to what extend can Turkey prepare its people to the idea of an amnesty? Even more difficult, how can Turks be convinced that it is far better for Turkey to have a political PKK presence than an armed PKK up in the mountains? Still, as Gül recently said, Turkey may yet achieve some historic openings in dealing with its Kurdish population.