The basic principle of the Justice and Development Party, or AKP's, mentality in dealing with problems, whatever they might be, is to create a "pro-settlement" perception without necessarily committing themselves seriously to a settlement, particularly if a resolution of the problem at hand might be a painful or politically costly one.
The AKP is willing to walk the extra mile on any issue provided that it is pretty sure the "other side" will eventually not budge, refuse a compromise and thus blame the failure to resolve the problem on the shoulders of the "other side" without the AKP undertaking any painful steps.
That was so in 2003-2004 with the United Nations peace plan on Cyprus (which is named after the then U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan and is often referred to as the Annan Plan); it is now with the American-sponsored, Swiss-brokered, Turkish-Armenian moves for a historical rapprochement.
In the 2003-2004 exercise, the belief in Ankara was that eventually either the Greek Cypriot leadership would throw in the towel and withdraw from the exercise of a painful compromise to share power with the Turkish Cypriot side, or at the end of the day Greek Cypriot voters would vote against the plan at a referendum and kill the plan anyhow, while in the meantime the perception in the world that the Turkish Cypriot side was against a resolution would be eradicated with a new pro-settlement image.
"Yes, we are against the plan as well, but Greek Cypriots will say no anyhow. Say yes and win without compromising on anything. Why is President Rauf Denktaş insisting on now understanding that without losing anything, we will be changing our global ’anti-settlement perception’ with a very strong pro-settlement image?" some senior political figures of the AKP administration complained to us at the time behind closed doors, while Denktaş was telling us, "Right, they believe Greek Cypriots will say no, but what if they say no?
Are we ready to accept this plan as a settlement? Are we happy with the terms of it? I am not! This is a defeatist approach. I will not subscribe to it!"
It took six years for Turkish Cypriots to get rid of the anomaly and bring an end to the CTP dominated governance on the island, though Talat still has one more year in the presidency. Anyhow, seeing the uncompromising stance of his Greek Cypriot counterpart Demetris Christofias, even Talat is no longer subscribing to the romantic "We shall be one step ahead of Greeks and Greek Cypriots" statement of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
Turkey is surfing in difficult waters with the "We shall open our ports and airports to Greek Cypriots" pledge the AKP government made to the EU in exchange of getting a date and actually starting the accession talks. Ankara is now in pains about how to avoid paying the bill, which could bring down any government in Ankara if it is to be done without a settlement on Cyprus.
Azerbaijan is no northern Cyprus We now have a similar situation with Azerbaijan. Ankara is sure that whatever "road map" we might have with Armenia to normalize relations will eventually collapse because Armenia cannot take the required steps to bring an end to its occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Ankara is after pleasing the U.S. with its movement toward normalizing relations with Armenia and thus avoiding Congress from legislating a genocide recognition bill.
President Barack Hussein Obama, however, delivered a strong slap in the face of the AKP government by not using the English "genocide" word, but using the term Armenians use in referring to the 1915 events. Thus, the U.S. so far has told Ankara that deception will not work this time; it wants to see "steps on the ground."
Taking steps on the ground, on the other hand, is not at all easy because Azerbaijan is not a northern Cyprus and is not dependant financially on Turkey. On the one hand, Ankara has no power to replace either Ilham Aliyev or the government in Azerbaijan; on the other, any move without the consent of Baku will stir serious political consequences at home.