Time for Erdoğan self-criticism

When Erdoğan read this, a column was reporting in daily Radikal the other day, he not only found it objectionable but also accused the Turkish media in question for "misleading the Westerners." Well, it rather looks like that the Westerners only reported what was all too obvious: the never-ending conflict between the Justice and Development Party, or AKP, and especially the prime minister himself, and certain media groups, including the Doğan Media Group, which owns several papers, including this one. That took a new level recently when the Turkish Treasury imposed a half-billion-dollar levy against the Doğan Media Group. I am no expert in tax matters, and I have no idea about the technicalities of the fine, but I just know that it looks all too suggestive when such a fine comes right after a heated war of words between the media group in question and the government. In the face of all that, there are two questions that need to be asked: Why is Erdoğan so much at odds with certain segments of the media? And what does he need to do?

A piece that sheds light on the former question came from one of his former advisers, Akif Beki, who has just started writing columns in daily Radikal. Beki, who has been the "right hand" of Erdoğan in media matters until very recently, explained that the prime minister’s feelings toward the secular Istanbul journalists go back to his earlier days in politics. During the whole 90s, when Erdoğan was a rising star, this "journalist class" looked down upon him and routinely used derogatory words about him to make this all-obvious. For example, they habitually referred to him as "Tayyip" in their news and commentaries, not as "Erdoğan." (In Turkish, if you use somebody’s first name, and if that person is not your close friend, then you give a strong message of disrespect.)

Moreover, when Erdoğan was faced with the threat of military coups, judiciary coups, and all other salvos of the bureaucratic establishment, the same "journalist class" cheered for his enemies and awaited his fall. They made it clear that they saw him as a countryside bumpkin who doesn’t know how to wine and dine, and who does not deserve to be the leader of "modern Turkey."

Hence, Akif Beki, argues, Erdoğan started to see these folks as adversaries, not objective journalists. When joined with his usual temper, and strong language, this comes out as a war of words against the media. And, as the recent tax fine implies, maybe even a war of deeds. This should help us understand the root causes of the prime minister’s attitude, but it doesn’t justify it. He might have reasons to be enraged and resentful, but these are not the qualities that will make him a good leader. It doesn’t make Turkey a better country either. Quite the contrary, the constant clash between the popularly elected government and the secular elite leads the country into permanent turmoil.

That’s why I believe the prime minister needs a moment of reflection and self-criticism. He needs to soften his rhetoric and rationalize his focus. He should see that by trying to knock his enemies down, he only infringes his own democratic credentials, increases social tension, and makes life difficult for all of us.

Islamic or Turkish?

We, on the other hand, should avoid buying into the line of propaganda that the ideological enemies of the AKP are selling these days. "We have been telling you that these guys are Islamists in sheep’s clothing," they are saying, "and now look at Erdoğan and see how illiberal he is." Well, the problem with Erdoğan is not that he is too Islamic. The problem, rather, is that he is too Turkish. The things we criticize in his behavior are the typical problems we find in almost all homegrown Turkish politicians. No wonder neither Deniz Baykal, nor Devlet Bahçeli, nor any other leader around, is too different. The political culture of the country simply is based on leader domination, confrontational rhetoric and lack of pragmatism.

And this has something to do with the subsequent military and judiciary coups, which destroyed the chance for institutionalization. Unlike the United States or the United Kingdom, where you can identify with political parties that have existed for many generations, in Turkey you can only identify with a political leader, whose parties will probably be closed down several times during his career.

In such a political setting, the leader becomes the main actor and all the flaws in his character become highly definitive. And the rules of politics growingly become Social Darwinian. That is the core of our problem.