Iran steers Iraq without firing a single bullet

Iraq is calming down a bit more compared to former days. For example there are no longer reports of inhuman treatment. U.S. forces are in control of the situation but since a gradual withdrawal from the region is about to start, all focus is on Iraq’s security forces.

The police are still split. They are split among the Sunni and Shiite and each group works for its own account. Therefore people don’t trust the police very much. The Shiite and the Sunni each use their own police.

The armed forces are slowly reviving.

Compared to the police the Iraqi Armed Forces are more disciplined. There is no split like in the case of the others. There is still sympathy for the Sunni and the Shiite but they don’t take sides. The armed forces use this sympathy as internal security becomes gradually more effective.

The point attracting my interest the most is whose influence is greater in Iraq’s daily administration. I’m not talking about the weight of 120,000 men in the armed forces of the United States. They naturally put their mark on the country with their high firepower.

The power I’d actually like to touch upon is Iran ...

Iranians manage to play an extremely influential role in Iraq’s daily life without sending a single soldier and without firing a single bullet.

Tehran’s weight on the Shiite increases with each passing day.

Iranians improve their religious connection and organic relationship. Messages to some extent from Qum and to some extend from Tehran reach their target in Baghdad.

Reports prepared by U.S. intelligence are very striking. These reports summarizing the names and activities of new armed groups established in Iraq by the Iranian Ministry of Interior point to the fact that Tehran has been developing its presence in Iraq in an unpreventable way.

According to estimates, Iran with serious action within five to six years will be able control the country’s Shiite segment and even wipe out traces of the U.S. invasion.

Washington is aware of this situation. But it is not certain what type of strategy it will apply in opposition. To be more precise, it is expected that Obama take office and deal with this issue.

Iran gives Kurds a dirty look
The only place in Iraq where Iran does not have a say is the Kurdish region in northern Iraq. It’s not only that Iran does not have a say but at the same time it watches the Barzani-Talabani relationship with suspicion. It also voices concern that Barzani supports the Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK, and therefore PEJAK Ñ a branch of the PKK that operates in Iran. Stories in some Iranian newspapers recently are full of traces showing that Tehran does not at all sympathize with the administration in northern Iraq.

With the start of the withdrawal of the United States from Iraq there will be an end to the comfort of the Kurdish administration. Washington will not leave Barzani and Talabani up to anyone, it will for sure give them necessary support but in everyday life the Kurds have obtained some power over the past four to five years and it is a fact that their influence will come to an end.

If we were to make an estimate in the medium and long run, we could say that Iran’s control over Iraq will increase, the Kurdish administration will lose to an important extent its ability to act and face an "Iran issue."

To tell the truth, Iraq and the northern Iraq administration are facing a future full of uncertainty. It is not for sure whether Iraq will remain or not as a whole once the United States withdrawals. As a matter of fact according to some intelligence evaluations of the Sunni and Shiite dispute will grow, with the support of Iran, the Shiite sovereignty will expand and solemnly remain in northern Iraq. With such a possibility, the Barzani and Talabani pair is facing heavy pressure from Iran.

These days the most frequently asked question and discussed topic in northern Iraq administration circles can be summarized as "Is Turkey in the long run a trustworthy neighbor in view of northern Iraq? Or should Turkey not be trusted?" We all should discuss this question.

The latest example for how foreign policy changes according to circumstances is the relationship between Ankara and Arbil, which the northern Iraq administration calls its capital.

Up until a few years ago the relationship between Ankara and Arbil was tense. To get into contact with Barzani was considered acknowledging northern Iraq and thus relations persistently would be conducted through Baghdad. This way it was said that Iraq’s territorial integrity was respected and Turkey got the message across that it does not advocate a potential independence of northern Iraq. This approach is desired by the Chief of Staff and the Justice and Development Party, or AKP, while the Turkish Armed Forces, or TSK, only adjusts itself.

After a while, it was understood that this type of politics did not work. Arbil did neither take orders from Baghdad nor pay attention to given messages.

In the end the Foreign Ministry convinced the TSK. The agreement between the United States and Turkey regarding information sharing signed in November 2007 and Washington wanting to open channels with Barzani made things easier. A new period has started with Davutoğlu pioneering the "Barzani rapprochement."

Ankara and Arbil have changed their former aggressive attitude and viewed developments differently.

This time Baghdad has started to feel uncomfortable.

The establishment of a dialogue between Barzani and Turkey has attracted attention in some circles in the Iraqi capital. During Maliki’s last visit to Ankara some experts in the delegation openly expressed their discomfort. A delegation member said, "We have encouraged Turkey to contact the northern Iraqi administration. But this has gone too far. We feel like there is something prepared without our knowledge behind Baghdad’s back. If a triple (Ankara, Arbil, Baghdad) rapprochement is to be executed we shall act accordingly," and mentioned that Maliki is right in being suspicious.

I do not presume that Turkey is playing games behind Baghdad’s back. Baghdad’s reaction seems exaggerated to me. But in the long run it seems a further rapprochement between Ankara and Arbil is unavoidable.

I’ll save this subject for tomorrow.