TEXT: Full transcript of Mark Parris interview

The decision does seem to have been made quickly.  But you have to remember we are only in the opening days of the new Administration.  In periods of transition, when some key people are not even yet in place, it’s not surprising that the decision-making process is sometimes a little unpredictable.  I think what’s important is not the process, but the fact that this was clearly a considered decision, in the opening months of the Administration, that has to be interpreted as reflecting its core priorities.  That has to be good news for U.S. – Turkish relations in the years ahead.

- Whatever the reason, why do you think the visit has been such a big story?   What does it say to the world about U.S. – Turkish relations and American priorities?  How should it be read by players like the EU, NATO, Russia, the Islamic world?

It’s a big story because we’ve never seen this before.  It took Bill Clinton 7 years to visit Turkey.  It took George W. Bush 3 years, I think, and even then it was only for a day and to attend a multilateral event.  So this says in a very potent way that the Obama Administration takes Turkey very seriously.�
Clearly the world is paying attention.  We’ve already seen reactions from some Europeans to the President’s strong endorsement of Turkey’s EU candidacy.  I’d guess the Russians will be watching closely as the U.S. and Turkey gear up their cooperation on strategic energy issues.  There has been, as best I can tell, quite a positive reaction in the Muslim world to the President’s words on Islam, and it will not have been lost that those words were spoken on the floor of Turkey’s Parliament.  The bottom line, I suppose, is that the revival of a U.S. – Turkish partnership that is more than just rhetorical is an important development throughout your region and the world.

- Should this be seen as a visit to the land of “Erdogan the conqueror of Davos”?  Should we conclude from the fact that it followed the “one minute” outburst that the Israel-Turkey crisis has already been patched up behind closed doors?  Or is it simply that the U.S. has higher prioities than the tension between Israel and Turkey?

I don’t think either side looked very good or statesmanlike at Davos.  The Prime Minister’s performance – as conveyed by the media – made a strong, basically negative impression on American audiences.   As someone who worries about how Turkey is perceived in America, I regretted that.  But predictions that Davos would destroy Turkish-Israeli relations or undercut Turkey’s regional influence were clearly exaggerated.  My impression is that the damage to Turkish-Israeli relations has in fact been contained: even if Israeli confidence in Turkey’s impartiality has suffered – and it probably has – Israeli leaders value their strategic relationship with Turkey.  And it is important that the Prime Minister resisted calls to take concrete steps to scale back state-to-state cooperation.  Under the circumstances, I doubt the Davos affair was a major factor in the decision to propose a visit to Turkey.

- How do you respond to the comment: “Turkey takes the place of Israel.”

I haven’t a clue what it is supposed to mean.  If it means we have to choose between one or the other, it is nonsense.  We won’t.  We haven’t.  We value our relationship to both countries and have always seen good relations between Turkey and Israel as enhancing U.S. interests in the region.  And not, I would add, at the expense of other parties.

-  Before getting to questions regarding Turkey, a few questions on the NATO summit.  First, why Rasmussen?  Why has Obama insisted upon such a name, and one with a style and history very different from Obama?

I’m not privy to the details of the deal to pick Rasmussen.  And I don’t know the gentlemen, so I can’t comment on his style.  He does have a history with the Muslim world, and I don’t think it was inappropriate for Turkey to raise this as an issue when so many of the Alliance’s challenges are in predominantly Muslim countries or regions.  President Obama clearly had a strong interest in a harmonious outcome to his first NATO summit.  My guess is that Washington’s approach to selecting a new Secretary General was primarily a function of that.  Showing flexibility on what was obviously a difficult decision for Turkey demonstrated maturity and responsibility, and, no doubt, helped set the stage for a successful visit a few days later.

-  Would Turkey have had a better chance of getting what it wanted on this issue if it had delayed the matter until after Obama’s visit?   Did Erdogan’s Davos outburst lose the case for Rasmussen?

The answer in both cases is, “I doubt it.”  In the first case, failure to pick a new Secretary General would have exploded the NATO summit, and the Obama visit would then have taken place in a very different context.  I’d be surprised if Davos came up at all in the resolution of this issue.

-  First a Davos crisis and then the Rasmussen crisis… Do you agree with comments by some Western observers that these two crises have hurt Prime Minister Erdogan’s image?

I’ve already said that I think the Davos incident made a negative impression on American audiences.  Some of those audiences have since been openly critical of the Prime Minister’s behavior.  Some have cited Davos to question his reliability as a partner.  I think that is too radical a conclusion.  And so, apparently, does President Obama.  As for the Rasmussen affair, most Americans are probably unaware that there was one: the only people inclined to draw conclusions about the Prime Minister from that episode were those who had done so before Rasmussen became an issue.  Clearly, it had no impact on Obama’s visit to Turkey, thanks in part, again, to the skill with which Ankara ultimately allowed the matter to be resolved.

-  Do you think Europe will ever give the U.S. what it wants on Afghanistan?  Is it asking Turkey to do more there than it is asking others?�

There are lots of ways our allies can help deal with what is, after all, a common threat in Afghanistan and its immediate neighborhood.  In an ideal world, I’m sure President Obama would have liked to take home commitments for new combat forces in Afghanistan.  We don’t live in an ideal world.  So we’ll take the help we can get, and I suspect we will keep after our allies to do more as we move forward.  In the world we live in, though, some countries can help more than others.  Turkey can help a lot, and of course already has.  I think a major reason for the visit is an awareness of Turkey’s long-standing influence on both sides of the Afghan/Pak border (as reflected in the trilateral meeting President Gul convened just before Obama arrived), of the role Turkey has played in ISAF, of the kind of “soft power” Turkey can bring to this effort.  These are vital inputs as the Obama Administration gets its Af/Pak strategy underway.

-  How do you expect Europe to react to Obama’s reemphasis on the importance of bringing Turkey into the EU?  Will his initiative help or hurt Turkey’s chances?

I suspect President Sarkozy’s response tells you that he and a lot of other Europeans will be hard to convince, if their minds are not, in fact, already made up.  But I think the way to look at this is: what if the U.S. stopped publicly supporting Turkey’s candidacy?  My guess is that it would make it that much easier for those in Europe who oppose letting Turkey in to win the debate.  And remember that, during previous periods of impasse between the EU and Turkey, for example after the Luxembourg summit of 1997, a strong, expanding U.S. – Turkish relationship seemed to provide a stimulus to what will always be, at its core, a Turkish-European conversation.  I think, on balance, we can help.

-  Now the visit to Turkey … In fact the central question before, during and after the visit is: why did Obama come?  If you make a list of reasons, what are your top five?

I think the answer to The Big Question has to lie in the bleak foreign policy picture the President inherited from his predecessor.  It’s hard to think of a recent U.S. President who has faced more – and more urgent – challenges abroad upon taking office.  When you face problems of this magnitude, you look for friends who can help.  The fact is that, since so many of the most serious issues are in places close to Turkey, or in which Turkey has significant historic or current influence, Turkey can help Obama more than most.  I think it’s about as simple as that.  If you want to put it in terms of a list of areas where Washington will be looking for help, I’d include Afghanistan/Pakistan, Iran, Russia and strategic energy issues, Israeli-Arab relations and more generally our relations to the Muslim world.  Armenia is something that requires careful handling, but is a special case.  Of course it can’t be a one-way street, but that would likely be the American short list.

-  At Ataturk’s Mausoleum and throughout his visit, his emphasis on Ataturk was very strong.   To whom is he sending a message through that emphasis.  The EU?  The AKP? The Islamic world?  Laicists in Turkey?   Or the TSK (from whom he will perhaps ask for troops in Afghanistan?  Or is he saying, “you can walk with me only if you are a laicist and democrat?” to underline once more that the project of mild Islam has ended.�

First, it’s inconceivable that an American President would visit Ankara and not stress Ataturk’s legacy and our respect for and admiration of Turkey’s secular democracy.  It is one of the elements, combined with Turkey’s predominantly Muslim population, that makes your country so unique and, indeed, so important.   So I would caution against over-reading the emphasis on Ataturk.  Second, your question presupposes that being laic and being democratic go together, and it implies you can’t be democratic if you are not laic.  Maybe I misunderstood the question, but most Americans simply don’t look at the problem that way.  I’m pretty sure that was not the message President Obama was trying to send.

-  How do you interpret the messages Obama sent to the Islamic countries during his speech in the Turkish Parliament and in his gestures in Istanbul?  Was the aim of the whole visit to give a message to the Islamic countries?

Given his personal background and the foreign policy challenges he’s inherited, it’s natural that this President should give a lot of thought to how and in what terms he engages the Muslim world.  The White House has promised an early major speech on America and Islam; they also made clear in announcing the visit that the speech in Parliament was not it.  But let’s be realistic: what he said about Islam in Parliament was very important and carefully considered.  Frankly, outside of Turkey those were the words that the media focused on, not the emphasis on secularism.  I’m convinced that Turkey’s Muslim identity was an important factor in the decision to go there so soon.  I’m also convinced, and this is clear both from his speech and the way he organized the visit, including the Istanbul program, that he does not see Islam and secular democracy as mutually exclusive.  Indeed, it is Turkey’s synthesis of these diverse elements of its identity that makes it so unique and, arguably, important.

- Obama used a very important expression during his visit to Cankaya: “Model Partnership.”  What is the significance of that choice of words?  Does it reflect a sense that “strategic partnership,” the phrase used in the past, has deteriorated in recent years?  Is the change in terminology important?

You can’t reduce this relationship to slogans, and probably people shouldn’t try.  When Bill Clinton used the term “strategic partnership” it was an accurate description of the way Turkey and America were cooperating – and cooperating very successfully -- across a broad range of functional and regional issues.  The thrust of President Obama’s Cankaya remarks, in which he put the formula explicitly in terms of partnership between “a predominantly Christian country and a predominantly Muslim country” has a somewhat broader thrust, but I’m not sure it reflects any change in substantive terms.  Any partnership between America and Turkey will be strategic; we all hope our partnership can be a model in terms of its results.

“Strategic partnership”, the phrase was first and most authoritatively used by Bill Clinton 9 years ago, not 18.  It may have been used before that, but it was not formal U.S. policy.

- What kinds of actions and positions would you expect from Turkey and the U.S. under the rubric of “model partnership”?

As I’ve suggested, I doubt the agenda will change much.  I think the implication of the term “model” is that it be perceived as successful both by the partners themselves and by third parties.  There is clearly plenty of room for improvement on the record of the past several years.  I think the key to success is exactly what the Obama team has been doing over the past few weeks: engaging with Turkey early; establishing sound relationships among leaders on both sides; making the consultative process a genuine one.  Whatever it means, the partnership is off to a good start.

-  In response to a question at the Presidential Palace in Cankaya, Obama said his views on the Armenian Genocide were a matter of record and had not changed.  In Parliament, he compared the Turkish-Armenian tragedy to the massacre of aboriginal peoples in America.  Have American President’s ever addressed this issue in such strong terms?

I cannot recall an American President’s linking the events of 1915 with our own, often shameful, treatment of native Americans.  The President’s point, of course, was that ultimately nations are better off in confronting the dark chapters all have in their pasts, and I think he should be taken at his word when he says he has not changed his views on the events in Turkey’s Ottoman past that he has called “genocide.”  I was personally heartened by the responsibility he showed during the visit in avoiding words and deeds that could derail the sensitive and promising negotiations under way in pursuit of normalizing Turkey’s relations with Armenia.  Assuming those negotiations bear fruit, it would obviously change radically the context of the American domestic discussion of this matter.

-  You were Ambassador in Ankara during Bill Clinton’s November 1999 visit to Turkey.  One common point in the two visits was that both Presidents spoke in Parliament for 26 minutes.  But if you compare and contrast the contents, what do you see as the most important similarities and differences?�

What is most strikingly different is the context.  Bill Clinton was speaking as someone whose initial years with Turkey were problematic, but who by the time he arrived in Ankara had come to appreciate deeply Turkey’s uniqueness and strategic importance.  He was able to speak on the basis of years of very productive, successful cooperation on a wide range of issues.  It was also a time when American influence was at its peak, prosperity was growing around the world, we were on the verge of a new millennium, and 9/11 and all that followed it seemed unimaginable.  He thus had the luxury of delivering a more philosophical, to some degree self-congratulatory speech, which looked ahead to promising future for both the U.S. and Turkey.

Almost all of that was profoundly different by the time Obama showed up in Ankara.  Obama was establishing a new set of relationships with a country with whom our relations had been rocky for some time.  He was addressing for the first time before a Muslim audience his and his Administration’s stance toward Islam.  He was laying out an agenda for renewed partnership with a country whose influence had waxed during a period when a distracted America’s had waned.  He was navigating around issues – like the Armenian question and Turkey’s domestic dynamics – that were less acute in 1999.  The speech reflected all this:  it was more businesslike, less lofty in its rhetoric.   But, I think, it was no less sincere in its assertion of the importance of U.S. – Turkish partnership.

-  In Turkey some have said “Obama has put fireballs in our palms while shaking our hands.”  What will the U.S. want from Turkey when the honeymoon is over?

This is, of course, where it will get interesting.  The fact is that, even during the previous U.S. Administration, U.S. and Turkish strategic objectives broadly overlapped; it was our respective sense of how to achieve those objectives that were often quite different.  The Obama team has a different, more inclusive style, and they are not afraid of diplomacy, even with adversaries.  So it ought to be easier to harmonize the U.S. and Turkish approaches.   But one can imagine situations where we will come out in different places.  For example, if Iran doesn’t respond to U.S. and multilateral overtures, will Turkey be prepared to join efforts to make it pay a price?  For example, as we try to revive our cooperation on strategic energy transportation, will Turkey be prepared to soften its tough-minded approach on transit of Azeri gas?  I fully expect that important tactical differences will pop up as we define the parameters of our “model partnership.”  And of course this cannot be a one-way street: Washington will have to prove it can be responsive to Turkish views, as well.  But my experience is that, if the channels of communication are open, if the top leadership of both sides is engaged, “win-win” approaches can be found.  The Obama visit has basically laid the foundation for that kind of dynamic.

- Will Turkey be asked for combat troops for Afghanistan; In case Turkey says “No”, will the definition of “model partnership” get hurt?

I don’t know whether or not Washington will press Turkey for combat forces, although they would no doubt welcome such a commitment.  If Turkey is not prepared to do that, I have no doubt that its other contributions will also be welcome.  I see no threat in this to the potential partnership;

- Mr. Obama said in fact to Turkey: “We have changed, you should also change”. At least, in Turkey, people have interpreted it in that manner. What does he want exactly from Turkey to change?

“Change,” this is a President who was elected as an agent of change, so it’s not surprising to find it as a part of his world view.  I think I’ll leave it at that rather than speculate on where, precisely, he would like to see change in Turkey.   II just don’t have time to get into it.

- To what extent will the Halki Theological school on Heybeliada Island be an issue high priority in the relationship?  Did Obama talk about this because it is a tradition for U.S. Presidents to mention it or will he become a close follower of the issue.

This is of course an issue that is of most importance to Greek Americans.  But Americans who are not of Greek ancestry, when they learn of this issue, tend to view the seminary’s closure as incompatible with what they know of Turkey as a modern, Western, tolerant country.  And of course Greek Americans are not without influence in our political system.   As long as this issue is not resolved, it will be an unnecessary and – to Americans --  unexplainable burden on our bilateral relationship.   And I will guarantee it will continue to be raised by every American President in every meeting with senior Turkish official as a matter of principle and conscience.

- According to you, would US not consider to press Armenia concerning the resolution of the question of Nagorno-Karabakh problem? Would not US provide its “model partner” with such a support?

I suspect the U.S. would be prepared to encourage Armenia – and Azerbaijan as well – to show the flexibility necessary to make this breakthrough.  That’s what “full support” implies.

-  As Turkey will not face the risk of losing Azerbaijan, are you expecting a real opening toward Armenia before the Nagorno-Karabakh problem is resolved?  Would not a Turkish slight to Azerbaijan work against U.S. plans in the Caucasus?

I’m well aware of the close bonds between Turkey and Azerbaijan.  I consider them, and I suspect any U.S. government would consider them, as a positive element in our assessment of dynamics in the Caucasus.  I doubt we would press either country to do something that would seriously damage that relationship.

But I also think it would be inconsistent with the spirit of the Turkey-Azerbaijan relationship, or with any relationship between close friends, for one side to stand in the way of the other’s pursuit of a legitimate and important national interest.  Turkey has been exquisitely accommodating over the years to Azerbaijan’s interests, and is clearly seeking in its ongoing dialogue with Armenia not to jeopardize Baku’s position on Nagorno-Karabakh.  It does not seem right for Baku now to try to hold hostage Turkey’s manifest interest in achieving a breakthrough in its relations with Yerevan.

-  Do you think the U.S. is preparing to come to Turkey with package deal similar to the one that worked in Northern Ireland?  What should Turkey expect to hear from the U.S. on the Kurdish question and on the PKK?

On the PKK, you’ve already heard Barak Obama say that the organization will remain on our terrorism list, that we will continue to cooperate with Turkey to counter PKK terrorism, and that violence is not an answer to the concerns of Turkey’s Kurds.  I have no reason to believe the Obama Administration will seek to inject itself into Turkey’s debate on the Kurdish question, although Obama made clear he will support and encourage steps to give all Turkish citizens equal treatment and opportunities.

- While answering the questions of young people in Istanbul, was the concept “minority” used for the Kurdish people a slip of tongue made by Obama or does it demonstrate the USA’s point of view about the issue?

I’m pretty sure it was a slip of the tongue.  I’ve seen a lot of Americans do it; I may even have done it myself in my initial months in Turkey.  Turkey is probably the only country in the world where the word “minority” carries the political weight that it does in your country because of the Lausanne Treaty.  When foreigners use the word, Turks almost always assume we understand its historical/political significance; they are almost always wrong.

-  What do you think Jewish, Armenian and Greek pressure groups in the U.S. derived from this visit?

These are by no means monolithic groups, and I wouldn’t dream of trying to characterize their responses to the visit.

-  Who prepares Obama’s speeches?  Who do you think prepared the Cankaya remarks?  Who is the architect of this visit?  Who is the unseen hero?

I wasn’t inside the process, so the short answer to all your questions is, “I don’t know.”  These things are group projects.  Our embassies, speech writers, bureaucrats of various ranks and descriptions all play a role.  There are plenty of people in this Administration who know Turkey and no doubt made a contribution: Hillary Clinton, Dick Holbrooke, James Jones and Jim Jeffrey come to mind.  Ultimately, the people who contribute to these affairs are selected for their ability to reflect the basic approach of their boss, the President of the United States.  If they don’t, they don’t last long.  Obama’s speech is Obama’s speech.

-  Is there a single issue that will keep people awake at night in the wake of the visit?�

Both sides sure as (Washington-Ankara) hell better get the Armenia piece right.

-  Is it significant that Michelle Obama didn’t participate in the visit?  Was it a gaffe to invite the leaders of the three opposition parties to a single session?

I think it’s clear now that the reason Mrs. Obama was not there was that they were leaving directly from Istanbul to Iraq.  I’m confident her absence was not a “message.”  It was probably a mistake to invite the three leaders to a single meeting.  Mistakes happen.  It had zero impact on the visit.

-  Turkey watched every minute of the Obama visit.  How about the U.S.?  Was there much debate over whether he should have gone or what messages he was sending?

Partly because for most of our common history Turkey has not been a “problem” country, the number of people in America who follow it closely is relatively small. That said, people – and the media – did follow the visit in some detail, and it produced a good deal of editorial comment.  Most of that comment focused on Obama’s message to the Islamic world in his Parliament speech.  A number of prominent commentators, notably the New York Times, welcomed the visit but expressed concern over evidence that the Erdogan government has taken its success at the polls as license to slow down reforms and intimidate opposition voices in the media and elsewhere.

-  Do you see any sense in which Turkish politics was “normalized” as a result of the March 29 municipal elections in the same way the U.S. was “normalized” last November 4?

I think it’s an odd question.  I’m not sure America was more “normal” on November 5 than on November 3.  I do know that the American people on November 4 spoke loud and clear on the need for change.  I personally think the message was less clear on March 29.  It’s up to Turks to draw conclusions on what happened, but the numbers speak for themselves, and Prime Minister has himself said he and his party will study the message.

-  How do you see Turkey in the aftermath of March 29?  Has Turkey become more polarized?  How do you read the AKP’s loss of votes?�

My sense is that this was an important milestone in Turkish politics.  As a matter of simple fact, it is the first time AKP has failed to expand on (or even hold) its percentage of the vote in previous elections.  But the party’s plurality remains a solid one and there seems little question that the U.S. and other governments will be dealing with Prime Minister Erdogan and an AKP government for the next few years.  Will this inspire the opposition parties to mount a more effective challenge next time?  I don’t know.  Is the result good for Turkish democracy?  Arguably.  In my experience, hegemony is no more healthy a phenomenon in internal politics than it is in geopolitics.

-  Has the AKP’s 8-point drop affected U.S. official views of the AKP?  Are there different points of view on this score?

President Obama has not revealed to me whether or not his view of the AKP has changed since March 29.  But my experience is that the U.S. government rarely questions the authority of elected officials, and AKP’s ability to govern has not been impaired by the municipal election results.  Barring early elections, Mr. Erdogan and his colleagues are the people President Obama’s team will deal with for the foreseeable future.  I don’t see evidence of a debate on this within the Administration.

-  The U.S. media has depicted Erdogan as an autocrat.  Yet Obama hugs Erdogan, kisses him and holds his hand.  Could we say that Obama rebutted the U.S. media?

The U.S. media and Barak Obama have different jobs.  The point of Obama’s visit, as I read it, was in large part to establish personal relations with the leadership of a country that, more than most, can help or hurt his efforts to restore American influence and leadership abroad.  You obviously don’t do that by picking a fight with your hosts or injecting yourself into local politics.  You are right that some of the Prime Minister’s actions and attitudes have begun to become an issue in America’s discussion of Turkey.  I don’t rule out that at some point, if they continue, they will be addressed in state-to-state channels: they have already been documented in the State Department’s human rights report.  But I would guess the President and his team hoped that the results of March 29 would speak louder and more persuasively than anything they would be able to say to the Prime Minister about his style.

-  Do you think the visit is due more to Turkey’s power or the AKP’s success?

I’ve already said I think the visit was about a (correct) perception that Turkey can help or hurt the new Administration more than most countries as it seeks to come to terms with the foreign policy mess left behind by their predecessors.  Part of that calculation is a function of objective and relatively permanent factors like Turkey’s geography, strong economy, and competent military.  Part of it is a function of identity issues like Turkey’s secular democracy and predominantly Muslim population.  Part of it is doubtless a function of the relatively effective governance AKP governments have given Turkey in recent years, and the foreign policy credibility they have garnered.

-  Have your thoughts changed about the AKP?  If so, why?

It’s not my job to be for or against the AKP.  I want to see Turkey succeed, because I’m convinced that a successful Turkey is a good thing for my own country.  Analytically, I give credit to AKP for giving Turkey several years of what, by comparison with its recent predecessors, has been relatively good governance and growth.  More recently I fault the government for squandering its 2007 mandate in confrontations that have kept Turkish politics tied up in knots and sidelined the reform agenda many Turks thought they were voting for in 2003 and 2007.  The ruling party has of course had some help in keeping the political pot boiling: I believe the questionable tactics used in 2007 and 2008 to check AKP’s power would have dealt a serious setback to Turkey had they succeeded, to say nothing of its reputation abroad as a modern, Western democracy.  I’ve been disappointed that the lesson the Prime Minister seems to have drawn from those tests is that he can or must quash any opposition voices that may arise, including in the media.  There are aspects of AKP foreign policy that frankly bother me: its stance on Sudan is one.  But I’m not as concerned as some in my country by the government’s pursuit of “strategic depth”:  the approach has a certain logic, it is not in my view fundamentally anti-American or anti-Western;  and it enjoys, as best I can tell, broad support in Turkey.

-  You have defined Ahmet Davutoglu as the “Kissinger of Turkey.”  Which of his features did you have in mind?  Do you see him as the key player in Turkey’s foreign policy?

In an introduction at Brookings Institution last fall, I noted as a joke that I had recently heard Henry Kissinger described – also in jest -- as “the American Davutoglu.”  The Turkish press, naturally, got it just backwards.  More seriously, my introduction made the point that Ambassador Davutoglu and Dr. Kissinger share distinguished backgrounds as scholars that they had the good fortune to apply in follow-on careers as diplomatists.  I don’t think there is any serious question that Ambassador Davutoglu occupies a position of trust and importance on Turkey’s senior foreign policy team.  I wouldn’t presume to define his role or relative influence more precisely.

-  There are people who are concerned that Turkish foreign policy is sliding toward the Middle East.  Do you share that concern?  Has there been a break in Turkish foreign policy?

I think there have unquestionably been differences in emphasis, and that those shifts have given Turkey a bigger “foot print” in the Middle East and in the Muslim world more generally.  I don’t think this necessarily poses a threat to U.S. or Western interests, as long as we remain engaged with Ankara in a way that, frankly, we have not always been in recent years.  Obama’s visit, as I’ve said, seemed to me designed precisely to put in place relationships and machinery that will minimize the possibility of any future drift.

- Everybody has been curious about this. In the last July 17, in your speech given in CSIS, you said: “The Constitutional Court will make a decision in mid-August, in a Friday night. For a while, the opportunities to get out from this situation without harm have increased”. All Turkish Media had written about this. Yet, all the time, they wondered: How did you know this?

My point at CSIS was that, while I felt the prospects that the Court would not close AKP had increased somewhat, one could not rule out the possibility.  I speculated that a decision to close would come in mid-August on a Friday because (a) it would have less of an impact on financial markets and (b) it had been my impression that similar steps (the e-memorandum, the decision to accept the case against AKP) had come late on a Friday.  I had no inside information.  I will say (Bulent Ali Reza is my witness) that when I heard the court was going to make its decision sooner, I concluded it meant that the party would not be closed.

- In the last report prepared by the CSIS, there is a severe criticism toward the Gülen community. Is it a view that is only dear to CSIS, or is there any change in the USA’s perception of the community? What do you think? In the same report, it recommends USA to seal also an alliance with the military? Would you support this suggestion, or did you find it bizarre?

I’m not going to comment on CSIS’s report.