Cyprus should not miss the last chance for unification
Güncelleme Tarihi:
by Mehmet Ali Talat*
Oluşturulma Tarihi: Mart 12, 2009 00:00
The Cyprus issue has been on the agenda of the United Nations for almost half a century. It is a problem that so far has defied all settlement efforts undertaken by successive UN Secretaries General.
The failure to solve the problem, however, does not necessarily mean that it is intractable, but it indicates that the lack of any incentive for a solution on the part of the Greek Cypriot side has been a huge obstacle for the settlement efforts. Although the efforts of the UN have so far not brought a comprehensive settlement to the island, the accumulated work nevertheless has shaped the basic parameters, which would be part and parcel of any future settlement in Cyprus.
Since 2004, I have spent a lot of time and energy in convincing the Greek Cypriot leadership to initiate full-fledged negotiations. With the election of Mr. Dimitris Christofias as the new Greek Cypriot leader in the South on Feb. 24, 2008, the longstanding deadlock in the negotiations has come to an end. Within a couple of months we agreed with him to start full-fledged negotiations under the auspices of the good offices mission of the UN Secretary General. The UN Secretary General has also appointed, with the consent of the two sides, Mr. Alexander Downer, a former Australian foreign minister, as his new special adviser on Cyprus.
Full-fledged negotiations commenced on Sept. 3, 2008 pursuant to four important agreements between Mr. Christofias and me (on March 21, May 23, July 1 and July 25, 2008). Accordingly, we have agreed that our common goal is to create a bizonal, bicommunal federation with political equality and that in this federation there will be a Turkish Cypriot State and a Greek Cypriot State, as Constituent States with equal status, as well as a federal government and that this partnership will have a single international personality. We also took up the issues of single sovereignty and citizenship and agreed on these in principle, deciding to take up their details in our future negotiations. We further agreed that the new settlement plan will be approved by our people through separate simultaneous referenda.
Still, in order to reach a settlement in Cyprus within a reasonable time, the established UN parameters and the UN body of work accumulated during four decades of negotiations cannot and should not be put aside. Keeping this in mind, we started by discussing the topic of governance and power-sharing, which is one of the six core issues that we have identified together; and we will continue with the topics of property, economy, European Union matters, territory security and guarantees. The Turkish Cypriot side believes that a comprehensive settlement is possible and achievable in the course of the first half of 2009, given that every aspect of the Cyprus problem has been discussed and negotiated in detail during four decades of negotiations. What has been lacking so far was the political will and courage to engage into a meaningful give-and-take process to finalize the comprehensive settlement, within the spirit of compromise and reconciliation. It is the expectation of the two peoples in Cyprus, as well as that of the international community as a whole, that the current two leaders will rise to the occasion and bring this protracted problem to a mutually acceptable conclusion. Although the two sides in Cyprus are the main actors in the negotiations, the role and the responsibility of the international community and the guarantor powers (United Kingdom, Turkey and Greece) in a settlement cannot be overlooked. Their main responsibility is to encourage the two sides for a mutually acceptable compromise settlement on the island. The UN, on the other hand, should encourage the two sides to negotiate on the basis of established UN parameters and body of work. Otherwise, any effort to deviate from the accumulated work would mean to discard the product of four decades of negotiations and start from the scratch. Certainly, Cyprus cannot wait another forty years for a settlement.
The process of negotiations will not be easy. There are some major differences between the two sides. Finding a compromise between them will require flexibility from both sides. The issue of property, which is the most complex and probably the most difficult topic to be dealt with, is a good example. It is unrealistic to expect that all Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots displaced by the tragic events of the past will be able to return to their former properties. The return of a big number of Greek Cypriots to their former homes would create tremendous political and economic instability in the Turkish Cypriot Constituent State. The issue of property should be dealt with in a manner making use of all the options available for the exercise of property rights, namely compensation, exchange and restitution. As for the issue of governance and power-sharing, the political equality of the two peoples in the new partnership should be safeguarded in a settlement and necessary mechanisms should be devised to implement this effectively in the workings of the state machinery. The issue of security and guarantees is also important for the Turkish Cypriots. To prevent the repetition of the past events, the continuation of the 1960 Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance is crucial.
Coming to the possible role of the EU with respect to the UN-led talks, I attach great importance to the European Commission’s oft-stated position that the EU will accommodate any solution reached by the two sides in Cyprus, provided these are in line with the principles on which the EU is founded. This is of vital importance because a solution will necessarily call for both transitional and permanent safeguards within the EU. Therefore, at future stages of negotiations we will need the EU to provide technical assistance on relevant issues. Considering that Greek Cypriots already enjoy full access to the resources and experience in the EU, the Turkish Cypriot side will need separate channels of communication with the commission to compensate for this asymmetry.
Of course, the prime concern here is ensuring legal certainty of the settlement within the EU. Adaptation as envisaged by Protocol 10 Article 4 cannot be accepted by the Turkish Cypriot side for various legal and political reasons. Provisions of the settlement should become Primary Law and this should be done in a politically acceptable manner. It is unfair for the EU to put pressure on Turkey to open her ports to Greek Cypriot vessels and planes while Turkish Cypriots are still under isolation despite the EU’s own decisions and commitments to end the isolation. Surely, it must be clear to all that such a development would destabilize the ongoing negotiations by tilting the balance further in favor of the Greek Cypriot side.
The choice today before the two sides in Cyprus is clear. We will both strive for a common future and show the flexibility required to solve the Cyprus problem, or we will be forced to accept the permanent division of the island. I am hopeful that this time the negotiations will yield a result and the long-awaited settlement of the Cyprus problem will be realized. Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots will once again become partners, enjoy the benefits of EU membership together and strive for a better life standard for everyone living on the island of Cyprus. The settlement will also consolidate prosperity and stability in the eastern Mediterranean region. The already developing relations between Turkey and Greece will enter into a new phase. With the eventual membership of Turkey to the EU, the southeastern part of the EU will be a hub of peace, cooperation and prosperity that will definitely contribute to Europe’s desire to be a strong global player.
* President of Turkish Republic of Norhern Cyprus.
This piece was first published in the Turkish Policy Quarterly's Vol. 7 No.3.
** The article was published on page 15 of the Hurriyet Daily News & Economic Review's March 12, 2009 edition.
Editor's note: Editorial policy of Hürriyet Daily News & Economic Review is to identify the northern administration of the island of Cyprus as Turkish Cyprus. This column uses a different terminology
Since 2004, I have spent a lot of time and energy in convincing the Greek Cypriot leadership to initiate full-fledged negotiations. With the election of Mr. Dimitris Christofias as the new Greek Cypriot leader in the South on Feb. 24, 2008, the longstanding deadlock in the negotiations has come to an end. Within a couple of months we agreed with him to start full-fledged negotiations under the auspices of the good offices mission of the UN Secretary General. The UN Secretary General has also appointed, with the consent of the two sides, Mr. Alexander Downer, a former Australian foreign minister, as his new special adviser on Cyprus.
Full-fledged negotiations commenced on Sept. 3, 2008 pursuant to four important agreements between Mr. Christofias and me (on March 21, May 23, July 1 and July 25, 2008). Accordingly, we have agreed that our common goal is to create a bizonal, bicommunal federation with political equality and that in this federation there will be a Turkish Cypriot State and a Greek Cypriot State, as Constituent States with equal status, as well as a federal government and that this partnership will have a single international personality. We also took up the issues of single sovereignty and citizenship and agreed on these in principle, deciding to take up their details in our future negotiations. We further agreed that the new settlement plan will be approved by our people through separate simultaneous referenda.
Still, in order to reach a settlement in Cyprus within a reasonable time, the established UN parameters and the UN body of work accumulated during four decades of negotiations cannot and should not be put aside. Keeping this in mind, we started by discussing the topic of governance and power-sharing, which is one of the six core issues that we have identified together; and we will continue with the topics of property, economy, European Union matters, territory security and guarantees. The Turkish Cypriot side believes that a comprehensive settlement is possible and achievable in the course of the first half of 2009, given that every aspect of the Cyprus problem has been discussed and negotiated in detail during four decades of negotiations. What has been lacking so far was the political will and courage to engage into a meaningful give-and-take process to finalize the comprehensive settlement, within the spirit of compromise and reconciliation. It is the expectation of the two peoples in Cyprus, as well as that of the international community as a whole, that the current two leaders will rise to the occasion and bring this protracted problem to a mutually acceptable conclusion. Although the two sides in Cyprus are the main actors in the negotiations, the role and the responsibility of the international community and the guarantor powers (United Kingdom, Turkey and Greece) in a settlement cannot be overlooked. Their main responsibility is to encourage the two sides for a mutually acceptable compromise settlement on the island. The UN, on the other hand, should encourage the two sides to negotiate on the basis of established UN parameters and body of work. Otherwise, any effort to deviate from the accumulated work would mean to discard the product of four decades of negotiations and start from the scratch. Certainly, Cyprus cannot wait another forty years for a settlement.
The process of negotiations will not be easy. There are some major differences between the two sides. Finding a compromise between them will require flexibility from both sides. The issue of property, which is the most complex and probably the most difficult topic to be dealt with, is a good example. It is unrealistic to expect that all Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots displaced by the tragic events of the past will be able to return to their former properties. The return of a big number of Greek Cypriots to their former homes would create tremendous political and economic instability in the Turkish Cypriot Constituent State. The issue of property should be dealt with in a manner making use of all the options available for the exercise of property rights, namely compensation, exchange and restitution. As for the issue of governance and power-sharing, the political equality of the two peoples in the new partnership should be safeguarded in a settlement and necessary mechanisms should be devised to implement this effectively in the workings of the state machinery. The issue of security and guarantees is also important for the Turkish Cypriots. To prevent the repetition of the past events, the continuation of the 1960 Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance is crucial.
Coming to the possible role of the EU with respect to the UN-led talks, I attach great importance to the European Commission’s oft-stated position that the EU will accommodate any solution reached by the two sides in Cyprus, provided these are in line with the principles on which the EU is founded. This is of vital importance because a solution will necessarily call for both transitional and permanent safeguards within the EU. Therefore, at future stages of negotiations we will need the EU to provide technical assistance on relevant issues. Considering that Greek Cypriots already enjoy full access to the resources and experience in the EU, the Turkish Cypriot side will need separate channels of communication with the commission to compensate for this asymmetry.
Of course, the prime concern here is ensuring legal certainty of the settlement within the EU. Adaptation as envisaged by Protocol 10 Article 4 cannot be accepted by the Turkish Cypriot side for various legal and political reasons. Provisions of the settlement should become Primary Law and this should be done in a politically acceptable manner. It is unfair for the EU to put pressure on Turkey to open her ports to Greek Cypriot vessels and planes while Turkish Cypriots are still under isolation despite the EU’s own decisions and commitments to end the isolation. Surely, it must be clear to all that such a development would destabilize the ongoing negotiations by tilting the balance further in favor of the Greek Cypriot side.
The choice today before the two sides in Cyprus is clear. We will both strive for a common future and show the flexibility required to solve the Cyprus problem, or we will be forced to accept the permanent division of the island. I am hopeful that this time the negotiations will yield a result and the long-awaited settlement of the Cyprus problem will be realized. Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots will once again become partners, enjoy the benefits of EU membership together and strive for a better life standard for everyone living on the island of Cyprus. The settlement will also consolidate prosperity and stability in the eastern Mediterranean region. The already developing relations between Turkey and Greece will enter into a new phase. With the eventual membership of Turkey to the EU, the southeastern part of the EU will be a hub of peace, cooperation and prosperity that will definitely contribute to Europe’s desire to be a strong global player.
* President of Turkish Republic of Norhern Cyprus.
This piece was first published in the Turkish Policy Quarterly's Vol. 7 No.3.
** The article was published on page 15 of the Hurriyet Daily News & Economic Review's March 12, 2009 edition.
Editor's note: Editorial policy of Hürriyet Daily News & Economic Review is to identify the northern administration of the island of Cyprus as Turkish Cyprus. This column uses a different terminology