Oluşturulma Tarihi: Ocak 13, 2009 00:00
The current, on-again off-again "gas crisis" between Russia and Ukraine, is not a problem for those shuddering in the record cold in Eastern Europe and those worried about soon doing so in Western Europe. Nor is it a problem for Turkey, threatened with getting caught in the crossfire of its own dependency on Russia. Rather it is a symptom of a problem. Or rather two problems.
First, the energy distribution system between producers and consumers is an archaic one, reflecting neither the realities of energy use or the realities of contemporary state and political structures. In the case of the pipeline serving Western Europe via Ukraine, for example, this is largely an architectural vestige of the 1930’s Soviet Union. The second problem is the bevy of Lilliputian problems tying down the Gulliver that should deliver a real solution. In this case, the "Gulliver" has a name: "Nabucco."
The driving motivation behind the Nabucco project is the goal of diversification of regional energy resources beyond that in the direct control of Russia and it gas monopoly Gazprom. We are not "anti-Gazprom." Turkey has a flourishing commercial relationship with Russia, Turkey will long need access to Russian energy, through the existing Black Sea pipeline and so will Europe. Conversely, the day is not that distant that Russia may revert to the status of gas consumer. Pipelines work in both directions and Russia will have the need for diverse import options, particularly from northern Africa.
Enter Nabucco, the long-discussed plan for an European Union-backed, 3,300 kilometer pipeline that would cost upwards of $4 billion and bring some 30 million cubic meters of gas to Europe each year. It would connect Europe both to Central Asia and Middle Eastern supplies. It would also benefit Turkey, both as consumer and transit country. The new capacity won’t end the importance of Russia. But it will be an important new asset in the mix, and in the long run one in everyone’s interests.
But the United States has been less than helpful because it fears this would serve to help end the isolation of Iran it so values. Turkey has been less than robust in its embrace of the project if it is to involve Gaz de France as a potential partner; a reservation tied to non-energy concerns. The Europeans tend toward a shifting mood, particularly Germany which has long and deep ties to the Russian energy sector and a former chancellor who is an employee of Gazprom.
It is time to get beyond this. A "Nabucco summit" later this month in Budapest is a good place to start. Turkey should be at the meeting in force. Turkey should go with a clear vision of its interest and needs. Turkey’s clarity will help others gain theirs. And then we should proceed with the construction of Nabucco.